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THE RENTAL CRISIS WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: THE CASE 




The Foreclosure Crisis of the 2000s has likely hurt renters more than 
homeowners. Incongruously, however, consumer enforcement agencies have been 
far more zealous in protecting mortgagors than tenants. This Article explores the 
under-protection of tenants as a class of consumers, particularly in a 
“commoditized” rental market, and examines how consumer enforcement agencies 
can more zealously incorporate tenant-protection into their mandates.
Much of the prior literature on the legal protections afforded tenants was 
published in the wake of the consumer rights revolution of the 1970s. This Article 
is the first to carefully reexamine, in the context of the modern rental market, 
whether tenants should be protected as consumers and whether tenants have truly 
reaped the benefits of consumer gains over the last half-century. The Article 
analyzes original interviews with state consumer protection agencies, engages in 
the first broad survey of state and federal tenant protection enforcement actions, 
and provides a new review of the caselaw addressing whether tenants are covered 
by consumer protection regimes.
Concluding that achieving systemic change through broad-scale policing of the 
rental industry is both vital and often overlooked, the Article proposes specific 
reforms that consumer protection agencies can adopt to better protect tenants.
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INTRODUCTION
America’s tenants have faced an affordability crisis since at least 
the 1990s.1 Recent data indicates that, even without the pandemic,
more than half of tenants spend more than thirty percent of their 
income on rent, thus qualifying them as “cost-burdened”;2 twenty-
five percent of rental households are severely cost-burdened, which 
means they pay more than fifty percent of their income towards 
rent.3 These cost burdens will continue to increase, perhaps severe-
ly, as the pandemic continues. While governmental housing assis-
tance programs offer some relief, less than one in four eligible 
households receive such help.4
As a result, “[e]victions have reached crisis levels.”5 In 2016, a 
staggering 6.12% of tenants faced eviction proceedings and 2.34% 
faced actual eviction.6 Matthew Desmond, the author of Evicted, has 
calculated that in some large cities evictions are filed against more 
1. See Richard Florida, The Deep Roots of America’s Affordability Crisis, CITYLAB (May 20, 
2015, 3:58 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/05/the-deep-roots-of-americas-
housing-affordability-crisis/393773; see also Brenda Richardson, America’s Housing Affordability 
Crisis Only Getting Worse, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2019, 7:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
brendarichardson/2019/01/31/americas-housing-affordability-crisis-only-getting-worse/
#54a563a3104b.
2. Michael Hobbes, America’s Housing Crisis Is a Ticking Time Bomb, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 19, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/housing-crisis-inequality-harvard-report
_n_5b27c1f1e4b056b2263c621e; HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2019, at 4 (2019) [hereinafter JCHS 2019], 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of
_the_Nations_Housing_2019%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/64KP-Y8MN].
3. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., The Impact of COVID-19 on Renters and Rental 
Markets, YOUTUBE JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., at 8:03–9:07 (Sept. 7, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1sxVpDEY7M; see JCHS 2019, supra note 2, at 5. Note 
that this article was drafted almost entirely before the pandemic. The pandemic increases 
the cost burden on rental households, perhaps severely. Renters have in large part main-
tained rental payments by borrowing from family and dipping into often-meager savings, 
and have avoided eviction due to eviction moratoriums, but these solutions are not sustain-
able. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS STUD., supra, at 13:32–18:53. We are likely headed towards 
a new eviction crisis due to the pandemic. Id. at 29:00–29:22.
4. Policy Basics: Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 15, 
2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-federal-rental-assistance; see 
also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: EVOLVING 
MARKETS AND NEEDS 7 (2013), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/media
/imp/jchs_americas_rental_housing_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/K58M-6TPY] (“[From 
2007-2011,] the share of income-eligible households receiving assistance shrank from an 
already modest 27.4 percent to 23.8 percent.”). The ‘housing assistance programs’ discussed 
here do not include the temporary emergency rental assistance provided as a response to 
pandemic, but rather refer to long term housing subsidy programs, such as subsidized hous-
ing and housing choice voucher programs.
5. NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, PROTECT TENANTS, PREVENT 
HOMELESSNESS 14 (2018) [hereinafter NLCHP], https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads
/2018/10/ProtectTenants2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ5N-AYGN].
6. Map & Data, PRINCETON UNIV. EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/map/#
/2016?geography=states&type=er (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
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than thirty percent of renters.7 Desmond’s estimate does not ac-
count for evictions through extra-judicial means.8 And we are 
headed for a new crisis, on top of the existing eviction crisis, due to 
the pandemic.9
The situation faced by renters is partly attributable to the fore-
closure crisis. But while the foreclosure crisis exacerbated the rent-
al crisis,10 the rental crisis was already well under way.11 Indeed, 
tenants have long faced crisis because, for decades, wage increases 
have not nearly kept up with rent increases.12 Shockingly, 
“[a]djusting for inflation, the median rent payment rose sixty-one 
percent between 1960 and 2016 while the median renter income
grew only five percent.”13 Concededly, this Article focuses on the 
most vulnerable tenants, but this fact does not render its analysis 
particularly narrow. First, a significant percentage of tenants face 
vulnerable economic circumstances.14 Second, even more financial-
ly stable tenants face frequent abuse.15 Indeed, tenancy involves in-
herent vulnerabilities,16 though abuse is, of course, far more severe
towards the indigent.
Tenants, thus, face a litany of consumer abuses. The abuse ten-
ants often suffer at the hands of landlords and property managers 
cannot be divorced from these epidemic levels of housing instabil-
ity.17 Dwindling supply of affordable rental units forces tenants to 
7. Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, In 83 Million Eviction Records, a Sweeping and Inti-




9. Harv. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., supra note 3, at 29:00.
10. See NLCHP, supra note 5, at 10–11, detailing how the foreclosure crisis exacerbated 
the rental crisis.
11. Florida, supra note 1; Richardson, supra note 1.
12. Hobbes, supra note 2.
13. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2018, at 5 (2018), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports
/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3DS-
6FRE] [hereinafter JCHS 2018].
14. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 
Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J.L. ANALYSIS 1, 24–25 fig.1 (2017) (documenting 
the prevalence of misleading lease clauses).
16. For example, tenants, especially in multi-unit buildings, depend on landlords to 
make repairs even where the tenants can afford such repairs themselves. See Joan L. Neisser, 
The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict Liability Principles to Landlords, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
527, 530 (1990).
17. Andrea Castillo, Barbara Anderson & BoNhia Lee, Fresno Apartments Crawling with 
Mice, Roaches but Fearful Tenants Stay Quiet, FRESNO BEE (May 8, 2016), 
https://www.fresnobee.com/news/special-reports/housing-blight/article75831252.html
(describing cost-burdened tenants vulnerable to landlord abuse); Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the 
Poor: Housing, Markets, and Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J. F. 458, 460–61 (2017); Louis W. Fisher, 
Paying for Pushout: Regulating Landlord Buyout Offers in New York City’s Rent-Stabilized Apartment,
50 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 491, 494–99 (2015); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 
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live in substandard conditions.18 A study conducted by the Center 
for American Progress found that approximately thirty million 
homes in America are dangerous to live in due to unsafe housing 
conditions, and this epidemic has grown worse as more Americans 
have turned to renting.19
But the abuses tenants face are by no means limited to habita-
bility concerns. For example, in order to make room for wealthier 
tenants or otherwise free up apartment space, landlords illegally 
oust renters through intimidation, deception, or pretextual evic-
tions.20 Illegal confiscation of security deposits is also a common 
problem. Fear of retaliation makes it uniquely difficult for tenants 
to protect themselves. Many tenants are hesitant to assert their 
rights for fear of retaliation.21 Undocumented tenants fear land-
lords will call immigration enforcement.22 Tenants may not even 
know their rights are being violated, as they are often subject to il-
legal or misleading lease provisions.23 The cause of the eviction ep-
idemic thus goes beyond the fact that tenants struggle to pay rent. 
As stated by Desmond, “[e]viction is a cause, not just a condition, 
of poverty.”24
Despite these widespread abuses, tenants do not have legal pari-
ty with other consumers. For one, courts may interpret Unfair or 
Deceptive Acts and Practice (UDAP) statutes, states’ primary con-
sumer protection laws, to not apply to tenants.25 As this Article
shows, however, even where such laws apply to tenants, consumer 
enforcement agencies rarely use their enforcement power to pro-
tect tenants.26
1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing further 
increases the landlord’s bargaining power and escalates the need for improving existing 
stock.”); see also NLCHP, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that tenants represented by counsel are 
exponentially less likely to face eviction, thus at least partially corroborating that eviction 
may often result from landlord abuses).
18. See, e.g., Castillo et al., supra note 17.
19. Alex Fernandez Campbell, Gas Leaks, Mold, and Rats: Millions of Americans Live in 
Hazardous Homes, THE ATLANTIC (July 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2016/07/gas-leaks-mold-and-rats-millions-of-americans-live-in-hazardous-homes/
492689/; see also Castillo et al., supra note 17 (noting that abusive landlords rent to a dispro-
portionately high number of tenants).
20. Shaila Dewan, Evictions Soar in Hot Market; Renters Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/us/evictions-soar-in-hot-market-renters-suffer.html
[https://perma.cc/5FUC-MRN2]; Steven T. Hasty, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure by Funding 
Needed Repairs, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 581, 592–98  (2012).
21. See, e.g., Castillo et al., supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. See generally Furth-Matzkin, supra note 15.
24. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 299
(2016).
25. See discussion infra Section II.A.
26. See discussion infra Section I.D.
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It is essential that tenants be fully integrated into consumer pro-
tection regimes for multiple reasons. First, UDAP statutes provide 
far more robust relief than tenant-landlord laws. Consumer protec-
tion laws often allow for the recovery of not only pecuniary loss, 
but also attorneys’ fees, exemplary damages, emotional distress 
damages, and for the imposition of equitable relief.27 The primary 
remedy under tenant-landlord law is the tenant withholding rent 
or standard contract damages.28
Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this Article, 
tenants would greatly benefit from receiving the full attention of 
consumer enforcement agencies. These agencies, vested with 
broad and flexible authority to enforce UDAP laws, have played a 
key role in advancing the rights of consumers over the last half-
century.29 In fact, in some sense, the consumer rights movement 
since the 1960s has been defined by the increased role of enforce-
ment agencies in protecting individual consumers.30 Tenants, how-
ever, have not been the beneficiaries of these efforts as, in practice, 
consumer enforcement agencies do not fully incorporate tenants 
into their mandates.31 Tenants must enforce their own rights, 
though they can seldom afford counsel.32 This Article argues that 
tenants are entitled to the same agency attention as similarly situ-
ated consumers.
Part II of this Article, thus, compares the respective formation of 
the modern consumer protection legal regime and modern tenant 
protection legal regime. Section I.A discusses the legal gains 
achieved by consumers generally in the 1960s and 70s. Such gains 
were largely defined by increased government protection of con-
sumers of tangible goods and, to a lesser extent, financial products 
and services. Part II.B discusses tenants’ legal gains during this 
same period, illustrating that, while tenant gains were influenced 
by the gains of consumers at large, tenants did not receive the full 
benefit of the consumer protection movement. Section I.C discuss-
es the next wave of consumer protection—that surrounding the fi-
27. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.1 
(Carolyn Carter ed., 9th ed. 2016) [hereinafter NCLC], https://library.nclc.org/udap.
28. Id. See generally David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 389, 407 (2011).
29. Prentiss Cox, Amy Wiedman & Mark Totten, Strategies for UDAP Enforcement, 55 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 38, 42–46 (2018); see also Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consum-
er, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 19 (2000); Michael Water-
stone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 462 (2007); Christopher L. 
Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL.
L. REV. 1057, 1060–61 (2016).
30. See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.C.
31. See discussion infra Section I.D.
32. Super, supra note 28, at 432 n.234.
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nancial crisis of the 2000s—which was defined by the formation of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and increased 
consumer enforcement agency activism against major mortgage 
banks. Again, as discussed in Section I.D, these increased consum-
er protection efforts were not fully extended to tenants. Even 
though tenants arguably suffered during the Financial Crisis more 
than homeowners, consumer enforcement action focused far more 
on helping homeowners than tenants.
Part II will examine why consumer protection agencies do not, 
in practice, fully incorporate tenants into their mandates. Section
II.A will discuss jurisprudential barriers to more robust agency en-
forcement of tenants’ rights. This Section will also serve as an ex-
cuse to survey the case law on whether tenants are “consumers”
under UDAP laws, an area largely overlooked by recent scholar-
ship. Section II.B will discuss underlying sociological factors be-
hind consumer agency under-prioritization of tenants. And Section
II.C will analyze original interviews conducted with consumer en-
forcement bureaus to identify institutional barriers to these agen-
cies fully incorporating tenants into their mandates. Part III will 
then discuss why robust public enforcement of tenants’ rights is es-
sential to protecting tenants, just as it is essential to protecting tra-
ditional consumers. Finally, Part IV will propose specific reforms to 
better empower consumer enforcement agencies to protect tenant-
consumers. The Article then concludes and suggests areas for fu-
ture scholarship.
I. THE FORMATION OF THE CURRENT CONSUMER AND 
TENANT PROTECTION REGIMES
In articulating the lack of parity between tenants and other con-
sumers, it is important to examine the modern history of govern-
mental efforts to protect consumers and tenants, respectively. Over 
approximately the last half-century, the consumer protection 
movement has twice generated an acute flourishing of regulatory 
consumer protection efforts: in the 1960s and 1970s and in the 
wake of the Financial Crisis of the 2000s.33
Tenant gains since the 1960s have been predicated on the no-
tion that tenants are “consumers” and should thus receive con-
33. Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private Enforcement of 
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Law, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 912 (2017); James H. Back-
man, The Tenant as a Consumer—A Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law and in Land-
lord/Tenant Law, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1980); Chamallas, supra note 29, at 10–16; see also 
Mary A. Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503,
510 (1982).
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sumer protections.34 Still, in essential ways, the gains achieved by 
consumers have generally not been fully extended to tenants. In 
large part, this is because consumers of credit and tangible goods 
have received a great deal of attention from consumer protection 
agencies, while tenants have not.
A.  Consumer Gains in the 1960s and 1970s
To understand the historical context of the early tenants’ rights 
movement, a brief discussion of the concurrent consumer rights 
movement is necessary. The wave of consumer activism in the 
1960s and 1970s “coincided generally with the more liberal politi-
cal climate of the 1960s and the movements for social equality that 
escalated in the late 1960s and early 1970s,” as well as with social 
uprisings inspired in large part by consumer grievances.35
Like previous consumer movements, this movement focused on 
“manipulative advertising and the existence of unsafe products.”36
Unlike past movements, this wave centered around a call for more 
direct government enforcement of individual consumer rights.37
Historically, for example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
focused on antitrust activity. But in the 1970s, the FTC shifted its 
focus to protecting individual consumers.38 States, in turn, enacted 
“mini-FTC,” or UDAP, laws, all of which granted enforcement 
power to a state agency.39 Federal UDAP laws and their state corol-
laries became the primary statutes used to protect consumers.40
Under UDAP laws, the delegated enforcement agency generally 
has broad discretion, not only to sue businesses for wrongdoing, 
but also to issue pre-litigation subpoenas, induce businesses to en-
ter into binding promises to not engage in certain acts, and re-
quest broad and sometimes preemptive equitable relief.41 Indeed, 
34. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075–79 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
35. Chamallas, supra note 29, at 17–18; Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconsciona-
bility as the ‘Law of the Poor,’ 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1425–26 (2014).
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 17–18 (“[W]hat marked out this era from earlier bursts of energy . . . was the 
presence of Ralph Nader and his organization’s impact on the federal government.”).
38. See Pridgen, supra note 33, at 911–15.
39. Backman, supra note 33, at 16. The FTC Act does not include a private right of ac-
tion. At first, state UDAP somewhat followed suit, allowing private litigants only to obtain 
injunctive relief, though such acts were then expanded to allow private litigants to sue for 
damages. See Pridgen, supra note 33, at 914.
40. See NCLC, supra note 27, § 1.1.
41. See id. § 13.
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since the 1960s, the consumer protection regime has largely relied 
upon government agencies for enforcement.42
Before discussing consumer gains in the 1960s and 1970s, this 
subsection will take a brief diversion to discuss the nature of UDAP 
laws.
1.  A Brief Primer on UDAP Laws
The National Consumer Law Center describes UDAP laws as fol-
lows:
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, 
and the Virgin Islands have enacted at least one statute with 
broad applicability to most consumer transactions, aimed at 
preventing consumer deception and abuse in the market-
place. Many of these statutes are patterned after the lan-
guage in Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act that prohibits “un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices.” The term “UDAP” is an 
acronym for this prohibition.43
UDAP prohibitions are often phrased in broad and general 
terms to enable flexible enforcement and application by agencies 
and courts.44 Within the defined scope of trade and commerce, 
UDAP laws tend to prohibit the use of “unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices.”45 What constitutes a “deceptive” or “unfair” practice 
thus warrants brief attention.
Though they are similar in ways, “unfairness” and “deception”
are distinct concepts under UDAP. Deception pertains to what 
most would likely consider archetypal examples of consumer fraud: 
“[t]he FTC and the CFPB both define deception as a material rep-
resentation, omission, act, or practice that misleads or is likely to 
mislead a consumer whose interpretation is reasonable under the 
circumstances.”46
42. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 42–46. As another example, in 1972, Congress passed 
the Consumer Product Safety Act and created the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
with authority to create and enforce product safety standards. Consumer Product Safety Act 
(CSPA), U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, https://www.cpsc.gov/Regulations-Laws—
Standards/Statutes/Summary-List/Consumer-Product-Safet-Act (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
43. NCLC, supra note 27, § 1.1.
44. Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 478–79 (1974).
45. CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES:
A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 1 (2018),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.
46. NCLC, supra note 27, § 4.3.2.1.
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Unfairness is more of a catchall referring to business practices 
which have the propensity to unjustly harm or take advantage of 
consumers.47 Instead of strictly defining unfairness, most courts 
apply the following factors to determine whether a given practice is 
unfair: (1) whether the practice offends public policy;48 (2) wheth-
er the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
and (3) whether the practice causes substantial injury to consum-
ers.49
Of course, no two UDAP laws are exactly the same.50 Some pro-
hibit only deception, not unfairness.51 Others include additional 
distinct categories such as “abusiveness” or “unconscionability.”52
Beyond these broad prohibitions, many UDAP statutes also state 
that violations of other enumerated statutes constitute per se 
UDAP violations.53 All state UDAP statutes include a private right of 
action and also delegate enforcement authority to a state agency, 
often the Attorney General.54
2.  The Scope of Consumer Protection Efforts 
During the 1960s–70s
With that primer on UDAP out of the way, this Article will now 
turn back to the consumer protection movement of the 1960s and 
1970s. Consumer gains during this era focused on protecting con-
sumers of tangible products—such as cars, furniture, and widg-
ets—as opposed to real property or financial products.55 While en-
forcement of UDAP laws could have been utilized to increase 
47. Id. § 4.3.3.1.
48. Id. (suggesting the proper question is whether the practice is “within at least the 
penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness”).
49. Id.
50. See generally CARTER, supra note 45.
51. NCLC, supra note 27, at App. A.
52. Id. § 4.3, App. A.
53. Id. § 3.2.2. Notably, while a small number of particularly broad UDAP statutes, like 
California’s, declare that any “unlawful” business practice is a UDAP violation, CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017), very few, if any, UDAP laws specifically state that particular 
tenant abuses or violations of state tenant-landlord laws constitute per se UDAP violations. See 
e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.17 (West 2020); WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 134.06–.10 (2018).
54. NCLC, supra note 27, § 13.1. The FTC Act and UDAP statute enabling the CFPB do 
not allow for a private right of action. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (outlining the CFPB); Schmidt v.
PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 859, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Inst. for Truth in 
Mktg. v. Total Health Network Corp., 321 F. Supp. 3d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that 
there is no private right of action under FTC Act); see also Cox et al., supra note 29.
55. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 
(2008) (noting consumer protection regulation’s focus on ensuring the safety of tangible 
products, as opposed to financial products).
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protection for tenants,56 this was seldom the case. Both state and 
federal agencies brought extremely few enforcement actions on 
behalf of tenants even through the 1980s.57 In fact, courts have in-
terpreted the model UDAP code, drafted in 1970, to indicate that 
UDAP laws should not cover tenant-landlord matters:
A consumer transaction typically involves a natural person 
who obtains or is solicited to obtain an item of goods, a ser-
vice, or an intangible primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes. Also included are certain analogous 
transactions in which a natural person obtains or is solicit-
ed to obtain a business opportunity in which he has not 
been previously engaged. In view of the extensive state reg-
ulation of securities transactions, their inclusion is left op-
tional. On the assumption that land transactions frequently 
are, and should be, regulated by specialized legislation, 
they are excluded altogether.58
56. For example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) does not usually per-
tain to the residential rental market. Eric M. Steven, From Landlord/Tenant to Debt Collector/
Consumer and Back Again—Landlord/Tenant Notice Practice and FDCPA Compliance after Romea,
35 GONZ. L. REV. 175, 177–82 (1999); see also Backman, supra note 33, at 19; Commonwealth 
v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 465 (1974) (arguing that the FTC’s regulation of 
other rental products indicates its authority to regulate rental housing). But see id. at 493
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (noting that FTC regulation of leasing arrangements has always 
targeted the leasing of tangible goods, not real estate).
57. See Backman, supra note 33, at 19. The only cases research has turned up during the 
1970s and 1980s across all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. Territories are 
those included in Appendix A. Further, besides Isaacs, Lefkowitz, MacFarlane, Abrams, Zim-
merman, and Schwab, all of these cases regard mobile home parks. These lawsuits are com-
mendable, especially as those living in mobile homes are often perceived to be particularly 
vulnerable. However, mobile home tenants represent a small percentage of American ten-
ants, indicating that application of UDAP to mobile home laws did not evidence a general 
trend towards protecting tenants through UDAP Enforcement. Further, in Schwab, the 
Court ruled that tenants fall outside the scope of UDAP; in Zimmerman, the court ruled that 
the AG did not properly allege a UDAP violation based on the allegation of withholding of 
security deposits without additional acts of deception or fraud; the Magley court held that 
the AG did not have enforcement power over the specific case; and Bel Fiore held that an 
illegal clause in 280 leases did not constitute a problem sufficiently effecting tenants gener-
ally to be actionable under UDAP. State v. Anchorage Trailer Sales, Inc., C.A. No. 76-7971, 
1977 WL 18408 (Super. Ct. Alaska 1977); State ex rel. MacFarlane v. Boulder Rental Prop. 
Ass’n, No. 80 CV 1583, 1981 WL 11409, at *2 (D. Colo. 1981); People ex rel. Fahner v. 
Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People ex rel. Fahner v. Testa, 445 N.E.2d 
1249, 1250–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. Isaacs, 577 S.W.2d 617, 
617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Gustafsson, 346 N.E.2d 706, 708 (Mass. 1976); 
Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974); State v. Solil Mgmt. Corp., 491 
N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Magley, 484 N.Y.S.2d 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
State v. Bel Fior Hotel, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Zim-
merman v. Nat’l Apartment Leasing Co., 519 A.2d 1050 (Pa. 1986); State v. Schwab, 693 P. 
2d 108 (Wash. 1985).
58. UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT § 2(1) cmt. (1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N. 1970); see, 
e.g., Heritage Hills, Ltd. v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ohio 1990) (citing UNIF.
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Still, despite the regime’s focus on consumers of tangible goods, 
the government also took decisive steps to protect consumers of 
credit.59 Congress passed broad regulations, such as the Truth in 
Lending Act, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act. Each of these statutes includes both a pri-
vate right of action and delegation of enforcement authority to a 
federal agency.60
Interestingly, while consumer protection agencies paid little at-
tention to residential renters, enhanced legal protections for credit 
consumers came largely in response to the practices of rent-to-own 
furniture stores.61 Because the arrangements were rent-to-own, pol-
icy makers and enforcement agencies viewed the furniture leases as 
extensions of credit and the rental payments as installment pay-
ments.62 Residential tenants, who generally were not renting-to-buy, 
did not receive the attention of these agencies.63
B.  Tenant Gains During this Same Era
Still, during the 1970s, tenants also experienced significant legal 
gains.64 These gains, which resulted in tenant-landlord law substan-
tially resembling that in place today, in many ways piggy-backed off 
of the discourse of the consumer rights movement.65 Such tenant 
gains rested on the notion that tenants are “consumers” and thus 
require protection from power imbalances favoring businesses.66 As 
discussed in Section I.D, however, tenant gains developed under a 
distinct legal regime are often less robust than the consumer pro-
tection regime.67
The primary tenant protections defining this era were the war-
ranty of habitability and the prohibition of landlord retaliation.68
CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT). Courts, however, have been less willing to read this provision 
to exclude homeownership transactions from UDAP. Keiber v. Spicer Constr. Co., 619 
N.E.2d 1105, 1108–09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
59. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968); Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724; Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
60. Id.
61. Fleming, supra note 35, at 1416–21.
62. See id. at 1421.
63. Backman, supra note 33, at 19.
64. DOUGLAS BIKLEN, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 131 (1983) (not-
ing that the Civil Rights Movement and the Javins decision, see case cited infra note 79 and 
accompanying text, were also integral to catalyzing the tenants’ right movement).
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075–79 (D.C. Cir. 
1970).
67. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
68. David A. Super describes the tenant revolution of the 1960s and 70s as follows:
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These protections remain the cornerstone of tenant-landlord law 
today.69
The proliferation of warranty of habitability laws was such a sea 
change because it marked an essential departure from the doctrine 
of caveat lessee.70 Caveat lessee, the primary legal principle guiding 
rental transactions for hundreds of years, dictated that, with some 
exceptions, “the lease gave the tenant the property ‘as is’ and the 
landlord had no duty to keep the property in a habitable condition 
or fit for a particular purpose.”71 Before the warranty of habitabil-
ity, America largely adhered to a “Sixteenth Century England [doc-
trine which] characterized a lease as a conveyance of property”72 to 
be governed by property law as opposed to contract law.73 As such, 
the landlord’s breach of lease did not excuse tenants from abiding 
by their duties under the lease; tenants could not withhold rent 
even if the landlord violated the lease’s express warranties.74
But under the warranty of habitability, the landlord had an im-
plied contractual obligation to maintain the property. If the land-
lord failed to do so, the tenant could seek recourse by withholding 
rent and/or using the landlord’s breach as a defense to eviction 
for failure to pay.75 The tenant could also sue for contract damag-
es.76
The other major achievement of the tenant revolution of the 
1960s and 70s was the wide-scale prohibition of retaliatory evic-
tion.77 In some sense, this prohibition is the cornerstone of tenant 
protection law, as tenant rights mean little if landlords can evict 
tenants for attempting to enforce them.
Though they did not place tenants on equal footing with other 
consumers, increased tenant protections were predicated on rhet-
oric and policy arguments analogizing tenants to consumers at
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw wide-ranging changes in tenants’
rights . . . The most prominent result of the revolution, however, was reading an 
implied warranty of habitability into residential leases, with a corollary prohibition 
on evictions in retaliation for asserting these new rights. These measures, eventu-
ally adopted in almost every state, seemed to reverse the landlord’s historical 
dominance of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Super, supra note 28, at 392–93.
69. See id.
70. See Barbara Jo Smith, Tenants in Search of Parity with Consumers: Creating a Reasonable 
Expectations Warranty, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 477 (1994).
71. Id. at 477.
72. Neisser, supra note 16, at 530.
73. Backman, supra note 33, at 1.
74. Smith, supra note 70, at 478.
75. See Super, supra note 28, at 394.
76. See id. at 400–01.
77. See id. at 413–15, 427.
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large.78 Scholars, for example, often credit the D.C. Circuit Court 
case Javins v. First National Realty Corp.79 with popularizing the war-
ranty of habitability and eroding caveat lessee.80 There, a tenant at-
tempted to introduce evidence of the landlord’s housing code vio-
lations as a defense to eviction for failure to pay rent.81 The trial 
court deemed evidence of the code violations inadmissible be-
cause, under caveat lessee, the landlord’s code violations did not ex-
cuse the tenant’s rent obligation.82
In reversing this decision, the Javins appellate court clarified 
that courts have typically used “the special rules governing real 
property to resolve controversies” since a lease was, at least tradi-
tionally, a “conveyance of an interest in land.” 83 Reversing the dis-
trict court, the D.C. Circuit held that “a warranty of habitability . . .
is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling 
units . . . .”84
The court specifically observed that while, in agrarian times,
tenants were often interested primarily in renting a piece of land 
for agricultural purposes, “when American city dwellers . . . seek 
‘shelter’ today, they seek a well-known package of goods and ser-
vices . . . .”85 Drawing on consumer warranty law, the court specifi-
cally argued that tenants should be protected as consumers.86 This 
decision served as the jurisprudential underpinning to this para-
digm shift in tenants’ rights. The warranty of habitability, along 
with other laws protecting tenants, quickly proliferated throughout 
the states.87
Still, the regime resulting from the Tenant Revolution was based 
on doctrines and enforcement practices distinct from those pro-
tecting consumers at-large. As discussed, while UDAP laws offer a 
broad array of available relief,88 tenant-landlord law is largely de-
78. See Neisser, supra note 16, at 546–48 (discussing that early courts recognizing the 
warranty of habitability did so on the basis that modern tenants require consumer protec-
tions).
79. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80. Smith, supra note 70, at 483.
81. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
82. Id. at 1073–74.
83. Id. at 1074.
84. Id. at 1072–73.
85. Id. at 1074.
86. Id. at 1077–79 (“[W]e believe that the consumer protection cases discussed above 
require that the old rule be abandoned in order to bring residential landlord-tenant law 
into harmony with the principles on which those cases rest.”).
87. This history is well-documented within several other articles quoted here and need 
not be repeated at length. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 29, at 10–19; Robert M. Mayer, The
US Consumer Movement: A New Era Amid Old Challenges, 46 J. CONSUMER AFFS. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
171 (2012).
88. NCLC, supra note 27, §§ 1.1–1.2.
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signed to enable tenants to withhold rent in a defensive posture.89
While contract damages may be available, these are likely small.90
Private attorneys have little incentive to represent tenants in litiga-
tion against landlords.91 While enforcement agencies play a large 
role in protecting the rights of consumers of tangible goods and 
financial products, tenant protections largely depend on private, 
often pro se, enforcement.92 As such, tenant and consumer protec-
tions each flourished during the 1970s but did so along different 
trajectories, to the detriment of tenants.
C.  Consumer Protection Activity from Reagan to Present
With the election of Ronald Reagan and resurgence of free 
market ideology, the progress of the consumer protection move-
ment greatly slowed.93 Indeed, “[b]y the 1980 election of Ronald 
Reagan . . . the third wave of consumer activism was dead and 
would remain dormant for the next twenty years,”94 though this is 
perhaps a bit more true at the federal level than the state level. 95
The Financial Crisis of 2007 spurred the next major wave of con-
sumer protection advances, which focused on the regulation of 
consumer credit.96 The Crisis, which burgeoned into a global eco-
nomic meltdown, was largely caused by the collapse of the U.S. 
subprime mortgage market.97 There are any number of dueling 
narratives used to explain the Crisis, but the basic story is that the 
housing bubble burst and brought the U.S. housing market, and 
then the world economy, with it.98 Then, due to this economic 
downturn and the resulting spike in unemployment and decrease 
in property values, America was hit by a second wave of foreclo-
sures beginning in 2010.99
89. See Super, supra note 28, at 389, 407.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See infra Section III.C.
93. See Chamallas, supra note 29, at 19.
94. Id.
95. Pridgen, supra note 33, at 911–15.
96. Building the CFPB, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumer
finance.gov/data-research/research-reports/building-the-cfpb/ [https://perma.cc/ZAN3-
LRPA]; Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/F3AN-
ED5B].
97. John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis: 2007-2010, FED. RSRV.: HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis.
98. Id.
99. The 2010 Foreclosure Crisis may be discussed as distinct from the 2007 Financial 
Crisis, but for the purposes of this article, they are part of the same narrative. See id.; Kath-
leen M. Howley, Prime U.S. Mortgage Foreclosures Increase to Record, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2010, 
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In their essential 2008 article, “Making Credit Safer,” then-
Professor Elizabeth Warren and Professor Oren Bar-Gill framed 
what would become the regulatory response to the financial crisis:
Credit products, like mortgage loans and credit cards . . .
are left largely unregulated . . . . Because financial products 
are analyzed through a contract paradigm rather than a 
products paradigm, consumers have been left with unsafe 
credit products. These dangerous products can lead to fi-
nancial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure, and, as evi-
denced by the recent subprime crisis, they can have devas-
tating effects on communities and on the economy.100
The article provided the ethical and economic underpinnings of 
a new wave of consumer protection focusing on consumer credit 
regulation. The article argued that, along with the regulation of 
tangible consumer products, consumer protection should focus on 
ensuring the financial safety of consumers of credit. As argued by 
Warren and Bar-Gill:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance 
of bursting into flames and burning down your house. But 
it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage 
that has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family 
out on the street—and the mortgage won’t even carry a 
disclosure of that fact to the homeowner . . . . Why are con-
sumers safe when they purchase tangible consumer prod-
ucts with cash, but when they sign up for routine financial 
products like mortgages and credit cards they are left at the 
mercy of their creditors?101
Warren and Bar-Gill specifically argued for the establishment of 
a federal agency to regulate mortgages and other consumer credit 
products.102 It did not take long for this to become a reality. In 
2010, with a new wave of foreclosures hitting the United States,
12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-18/prime-u-s-mortgage-
foreclosures-rise-to-record-on-unemployment-pressure [https://perma.cc/V8DV-X2AD]. As
illustrated by these sources, the crisis from 2007–2010 was fueled by defaults on subprime 
loans, while 2010 marked a spike in defaults on prime loans.
100. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55, at 1.
101. Warren, supra note 96. Importantly, as discussed, before Dodd-Frank and the CFPB, 
there was a great deal of regulation protecting consumers of credit, but credit consumers 
were still not protected as much as consumers of tangible goods just as, today, consumers of 
rental housing enjoy less protection than consumers of credit or tangible goods. See supra
Part II.
102. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55, at 98–100.
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Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.103 The 
following year, Congress founded the CFPB, delegating them 
broad enforcement power over Dodd-Frank and empowering them 
to enforce Dodd-Frank’s general UDAP prohibitions.104 Shortly 
thereafter, state attorneys general teamed up with federal regula-
tors to bring a multitude of UDAP litigation against major mort-
gage services for their malfeasance surrounding the crash.105 Thus, 
in response to the financial crisis, Congress established a broad 
new consumer regulatory framework and a new independent 
agency to enforce it. State and federal agencies pursued high pro-
file enforcement actions against mortgage servicers.
D.  These Gains Have Not Been Fully Extended to Renters
The regulatory effort to protect homeowners in response to the 
Foreclosure Crisis was far more robust than that aimed at protect-
ing renters, despite the fact that the Crisis likely hurt renters more 
than homeowners.106 Indeed, approximately forty percent of fami-
lies displaced by foreclosures during the Crisis were renters.107 This 
does not account for renters displaced from properties zoned as 
owner-occupied.108 More importantly, it does not account for the 
additional displacement of renters from job loss, rent hikes, and 
the conversion and demolition of rental properties taking place 
103. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010).
104. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 96.
105. See What Was the National Mortgage Settlement?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 
10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-was-the-national-mortgage-
settlement-en-2071 [https://perma.cc/V7T9-83RX].
106. David Lurie, Rental Home Sweet Home: The Disparate Impact Solution for Renters Evicted 
from Residential Foreclosures, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 247 (2016) (“Less attention has been 
paid to the of the foreclosure crisis on renters, who by some estimations constitute 40% of 
all Americans displaced by foreclosure.”); Steven T. Hasty, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure by 
Funding Needed Repairs, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 581, 593–94 (2012); Carsten Grellmann, Why State 
Courts May Prove Most Effective at Allowing the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act to Protect Ten-
ants, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 295, 297–98 (2011) (noting deficiencies in 
the PTFA, such as the fact that there is no enforcement mechanism beyond tenants using it 
as a defense to eviction).
107. SHAMBHAVI MANGLIK, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE:
A FRESH LOOK AT AN ONGOING PROBLEM XI (2012), http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files
/Renters_in_Foreclosure_2012.pdf; Lurie, supra note 106, at 247. While not all foreclosures 
end in displacement, to get a sense of the scope of the problem, “[b]etween 2006 and 2014, 
nearly 10 million homeowners in America saw the foreclosure sale of their own homes,”
which indicates that at least 40 million rental households likely saw foreclosure, though this 
may not account for foreclosure of larger multiunit rental properties. Viktoria Ney, Many 
Americans Ended up Homeless During the Real Estate Crisis 10 Years Ago— Here’s Where They Are
Now (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-where-those-who-lost-homes-
during-the-us-housing-crisis-are-now-2018-8.
108. See MANGLIK, supra note 107, at 5.
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due to the Foreclosure Crisis.109 Further, the crisis for renters both 
predates the Foreclosure Crisis and has continued even years after 
it ended.110 Having faced several decades of an affordability crisis,111
renters remain largely reliant on the legal regime put in place in 
the 1970s.112 As with the foreclosure crisis, this rental crisis is not 
merely one of affordability, but also of consumer abuse.113 These 
abuses, in turn, exacerbate affordability issues and result in serious 
negative externalities for families, communities, and society.114
Tenants, however, have not reaped the full benefit of consumer 
protection reforms occurring in the wake of the Financial Crisis. 
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB’s regulatory power applies only to 
the sale of “financial products,” like mortgages.115 Renting a house 
does not involve an extension of credit so these enhanced protec-
tions do not apply to tenants.116 Similarly, the FTC, with some ex-
ceptions, rarely takes action to protect tenants.117
In 2009, Congress did pass the Protecting Tenants at Foreclo-
sure Act (PTFA), which, in many circumstances, obligates purchas-
ers of foreclosed properties to respect the existing leases of tenants 
in the property.118 But, like most laws protecting tenants, the Act 
109. Danilo Pelletiere & Keith Wardrip, Renters and the Housing Credit Crisis, POVERTY &
RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL, https://prrac.org/renters-and-the-housing-credit-crisis (fo-
cusing on renters directly displaced due to foreclosures as opposed to other negative exter-
nalities of the housing crisis).
110. See JCHS 2019, supra note 2, at 2–3; JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 4–6; Carey L. 
Biron,  Why Unaffordable Rental Housing May Be New Normal in the US, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2020/0131/Why-
unaffordable-rental-housing-may-be-new-normal-in-the-US [https://perma.cc/ZG33-AYU5]
(“The price of rental properties has risen by 150% between 2010 and 2020, and it may con-
tinue to rise, according to a new Harvard study. The nation’s lowest-income renters are feel-
ing the brunt of the housing crisis.”).
111. Richardson, supra note 1.
112. See generally Super, supra note 28 (discussing the formation of this regime in the 
context of later reforms).
113. See supra Part I; Super, supra note 28, at 405; supra notes 18–20 and accompanying 
text.
114. David Brancaccio & Katie Long, Millions of Americans Are Evicted Every Year — and Not 
Just in Big Cities, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/04/09/
eviction-desmond-princeton-housing-crisis-rent [https://perma.cc/H6TM-3QGZ].
115. See Dodd-Frank: Title X - Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, L. INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_x_-_bureau_of_consumer_financial_
protection (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
116. Grellmann, supra note 106, at 313–14 (observing that while the CFPB may be well-
situated to enforce the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, protecting tenants is outside 
of the CFPB’s jurisdiction).
117. See infra Appendix B. Most of the Federal suits protecting tenants are Fair Housing 
lawsuits, which are vital but are not ‘tenant-protection suits’ in the context of this article, as 
they focus upon the disparate treatment of some groups of tenants. See, e.g., Complaint, FTC 
v. Apartment Hunters, Inc., No. 8:18-CV-1636 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2018), 2018 WL 9815931.
118. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, div. A. tit. VII, § 
701, 123 Stat. 1633, 1660.
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relies on private enforcement.119 The only way the law can be raised 
is as a defense to eviction—and there are serious doubts about its 
efficacy.120 Congress took little other action to help tenants, failing 
to even properly fund federal housing subsidies to keep up with in-
flation.121
State enforcement agencies also have not prioritized the protec-
tion of tenants since the Foreclosure Crisis. This is perhaps best 
exemplified by the terms of the consent judgments entered into 
between state enforcement agencies and mortgage servicers.122 In 
the wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, state attorneys general, often in 
concert with federal agencies, entered into several multistate na-
tional mortgage settlements.123 These settlements consisted of 
elaborate consent judgments, providing penalties for servicers, re-
lief for consumers, and requiring servicers to institute extensive 
policy initiatives and reforms.124 Notably, these consent judgments 
mandate reforms that reach far broader than the servicer conduct 
underlying the litigation.125
Settlements with mortgage servicers could have also included 
broad relief for renters.126 Because the vast majority of foreclosed 
homes were repurchased by the foreclosing lenders, the Crisis led 
to mortgage servicers becoming the landlords for tenants still re-
siding in foreclosed properties.127 Despite widespread reports of 
119. Grellmann, supra note 106, at 297.
120. Grellmann, supra note 106, at 297–98 (noting deficiencies in the PTFA, such as the 
fact that there is no enforcement mechanism beyond tenants using it as a defense to evic-
tion).
121. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING:
EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR A DIVERSE AND GROWING DEMAND 6 (2015), https://www.jchs.
harvard.edu/sites/default/files/media/imp/America%27s%20Rental%20Housing%202015
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4FN-EVTC].
122. As federal agencies were also generally party to these consents, the substance of 
them is also reflective of the federal government’s approach. See generally JOINT STATE-
FEDERAL NAT’L MORTGAGE SERVICING SETTLEMENTS [hereinafter NMS], http://www.
nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZYS2-ZHKU]; Settlement Documents,
JOINT STATE-FEDERAL NAT’L MORTGAGE SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http://www.national
mortgagesettlement.com/settlement-documents.html [https://perma.cc/E2KL-9VWS].
123. Press Release, DOJ, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 
Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing 
and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-
government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest; see Settlement 
Documents, supra note 122.
124. Settlement Documents, supra note 122; see, e.g., Consent Judgment, United States v. 
Bank of Am. Corp., 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012).
125. Id.
126. See Grellmann, supra note 106, at 295 (noting that foreclosing lenders often take 
possession of the property and thus bear responsibility for remaining tenants under the 
PTFA).
127. Janet Portman, Rights of Renters in Foreclosure, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/renters-foreclosure-what-are-their-30064.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
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tenant abuse in foreclosed properties, however, these consent 
judgments included little help for renters.128
Taking one such consent judgment as an example,129 in the 130-
page general settlement,130 there are only two items dedicated to 
protecting tenants in foreclosure, and both of them do only slight-
ly more than tell mortgage servicers to follow the law. One provi-
sion obligates servicers to follow the law and to put policies in 
place to ensure they follow the law.131 Another section empowers 
the Settlement Monitor to assess servicer treatment of tenants.132 If 
the Monitor finds that the servicers are unreasonably injuring ten-
ants, the Monitor may include compliance metrics assessing treat-
ment of tenants.133 These metrics may not go beyond assessing ser-
vicer compliance with existing law, though, and no new tenant 
protections are included.134
That said, in recent years, state consumer enforcement agencies 
have increasingly taken action to protect tenants, though there is 
little aggregated data on the matter.135 There is reason to believe, 
though, that consumer fraud bureaus do not fully incorporate ten-
ants into their mandates. One strong, though imprecise, indicator 
comes from the National Attorneys General Training and Research
Institute database, a database of attorney general lawsuits, which
only active attorneys general can access. A search by administrators 
uncovered a total of only four hits using the search terms “tenant”
or “landlord.”136
Further, research indicates that, as of July 2019, twenty-six states 
had never brought an enforcement action to protect tenants.137
128. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-
RMC, at A-40, E-9, E-25 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012); see also Settlement Documents, supra note 122.
129. Though the other consent judgments are not materially different in this regard. See 
Settlement Documents, supra note 122.
130. Consent Judgment, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC
(D.DC. 2012). This includes the settlement through Exhibit A.
131. Id. at A-40 (“Tenants’ Rights. 1. Servicer shall comply with all applicable state and 
federal laws governing the rights of tenants living in foreclosed residential properties. 2. 
Servicer shall develop and implement written policies and procedures to ensure compliance 
with such laws.”).
132. Id. at E-8–E-9.
133. Id.
134. Id. at E-9.
135. One article aggregated the types of consumer lawsuits brought by state attorneys 
general in 2014, but, perhaps tellingly, in quantifying the industries targeted in these law-
suits, the authors did not code for tenant-landlord cases. Cox et al., supra note 29; see also E-
mail from Prentiss Cox, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., to Author (Aug. 19, 2019) 
(on file with author).
136. E-mail from Emily Myers, Antitrust Counsel, Nat’l Att’ys Gen. Training & Rsch. Inst. 
to Author (Apr. 1, 2019).
137. See infra Appendix A. This chart is based on original research attempting to chart all 
tenant-related state civil enforcement actions, excluding fair housing/discrimination cases, 
through July 2019. Research methods involved searching on Westlaw and state consumer 
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While there has been a recent uptick of tenant enforcement ef-
forts, they have been primarily concentrated within New York, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, and Massachusetts, and 
thus do not indicate a national trend.138 Further, some states that 
took a particularly active role in mortgage servicing litigation have
not extended such efforts to protect tenants reeling from the 
Housing Crisis.139
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE STATUS QUO
The question then becomes: Why, in practice, don’t consumer 
protection agencies fully integrate tenants into their mandates? 
“Consumer enforcement agencies,” in this context, refers to state 
consumer protection bureaus, which are usually a subdivision of 
the Attorney General’s Office, as well as federal agencies like the 
FTC and CFPB.140
This Article focuses on state consumer protection agencies be-
cause these seem to be the agencies best situated and most likely to 
protect tenants.141 After all, integral to the Tenant Revolution of 
the 1970s was the view that tenants are consumers in need of con-
sumer protection.142 Likewise, this Article focuses on consumer en-
forcement agencies’ application of UDAP laws, as these laws pro-
protection agency websites for lists of actions brought on behalf of tenants. Common search 
terms included: attorney general; consumer protection; tenant!; State ex rel.; People ex rel.; 
and landlord. The Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
Laws site was also searched for press releases from the last 12 months, then the web page for 
each relevant state office was visited to see if there were any additional press releases or cases 
mentioned, and a web search was done for new cases related to tenants and consumer pro-
tection in each state.
138. Id.
139. Iowa, for example, has brought few lawsuits on behalf of tenants, see infra Appen-
dix A, but led a multistate coalition of state consumer enforcement bureaus in mortgage 
servicer “Robosigning litigation,” one of civil law enforcement’s most prominent responses 
to the Foreclosure Crisis. See State Attorneys General Are the New Bank Regulators, AM. BANKER
(Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/state-attorneys-general-are-the-
new-bank-regulators; see also Carole Fleck, $25 Billion Deal Reached to Aid Distressed Homeown-
ers, AARP (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.aarp.org/money/credit-loans-debt/info-02-
2012/robo-signed-foreclosures.html.
140. The CFPB’s jurisdiction, however, generally does not extend to the residential rent-
al market, and tenants do not seem to turn to the FTC for help. See generally FTC, CONSUMER 
SENTINEL NETWORK, DATA BOOK 2019, at 7 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2019/consumer_sentinel_
network_data_book_2019.pdf .
141. This is not, however, meant to be a nominal point. This Article discusses infra that 
tenants need protection from consumer enforcement agencies. This Article takes no stance 
on whether this should be done through existing agencies or whether new agencies should 
be established to specifically focus on tenant issues.
142. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Common-
wealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 467–68, 477–80 (1974).
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vide consumer protection agencies with their primary mandates. It 
also bears mention, however, that other enforcement agencies 
have not filled this gap.143
There are three primary explanations for the seeming hesitance 
of these delegated agencies to employ UDAP laws to protect ten-
ants: statutory/jurisdictional explanations, sociological explana-
tions, and institutional explanations.
Section II.A discusses statutory/jurisdictional explanations, i.e., 
instances where UDAP statutes explicitly exclude the protection of 
tenants or where courts have interpreted them to do so. Section
II.B then discusses sociological explanations for tenants’ lack of 
parity with other consumers. This Section focuses on the overarch-
ing social and political structures that make it less likely for gov-
ernment institutions to prioritize renters.
Finally, Section II.C discusses institutional explanations, as ex-
pressed by the agencies themselves. To learn more about consum-
er agencies’ attitudes and approaches to protecting tenants, the 
author interviewed representatives from ten state consumer fraud 
bureaus.144 Of course, this does not constitute a statistically signifi-
cant sample, and this Article does not claim to be a quantitative 
analysis. Rather, these interviews are used to offer qualitative in-
sights into consumer protection bureaus’ approaches to tenant 
protection.
A. Statutory/Jurisdictional Explanations
While it is not the case in most states, a significant minority of 
state UDAP statutes exclude tenants.145 The scope of commerce 
regulated by UDAP varies by state.146 A prototypical UDAP statute 
may, for example, prohibit the use of unfair or deceptive practices 
within the scope of trade and commerce, where commerce is de-
fined as the “advertising, selling, and leasing of goods and ser-
vices.”147 Some UDAP statutes exclude or include specific transac-
tions within their scope, such as real property transactions.148
UDAP statutes also often exempt certain specific industries, com-
monly the utility industry, for example.149 UDAP laws may also ex-
143. See infra Appendix A; Grellmann, supra note 106, at 297.
144. See infra Section II.C.
145. See NCLC, supra note 27, § 8.2; Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, Coverage of Leases Un-
der State Consumer Protection Statutes, 89 A.L.R. 4th 854 (1991).
146. Thomas, supra note 145.
147. See NCLC, supra note 27, at App. A.
148. See id.
149. See id. § 2.3.
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clude from coverage practices otherwise permitted by law, i.e., 
practices sanctioned by other more industry-specific regulations.150
In some instances, UDAP statutory language is seemingly explic-
it about the inclusion or exclusion of tenant issues; statutory text, 
however, is not always determinative.151 For example, leasing of real 
property is specifically included within the scope of “trade and 
commerce” covered by Michigan’s UDAP law, but at least one 
court has excluded such coverage on the basis that state tenant-
landlord law displaces UDAP’s application.152 Similarly, while Mary-
land’s UDAP law explicitly prohibits “the use of any unfair, abusive, 
or deceptive trade practice . . . in . . . [t]he . . . lease . . . of . . . con-
sumer realty,” courts have significantly limited the protections the 
law offers to tenants.153
It should also be noted that reading a UDAP statute to either in-
clude or exclude tenants is not necessarily determinative of wheth-
er that state’s consumer protection bureau will use UDAP to pro-
tect tenants. For example, several Florida cases hold that Florida’s
UDAP statute applies to protect tenants,154 but Florida’s state con-
sumer protection agencies have brought few, if any, UDAP en-
150. See id. § 2.3.3.3. Section 2.3.3.1 summarizes the mainstream approach to such exclu-
sions: Certain UDAP statutes exclude from UDAP coverage only practices “permitted” by law 
or “authorized” by a regulatory agency. This language exempts far fewer practices than stat-
utes using the term “regulated,” since a practice may be remedied by the UDAP statute 
where there is an insufficient showing that the particular challenged activity is specifically 
permitted or authorized by law.
To claim this type of exemption, “a defendant must show more than the mere exist-
ence of a related or even overlapping regulatory scheme that covers the transaction. Rather, 
a defendant must show that such scheme affirmatively permits the practice which is alleged 
to be unfair or deceptive . . . .” Conduct is not specifically authorized by an agency merely 
because it has not been specifically prohibited.
151. For example, see discussion of the CFPB’s jurisdiction, text accompanying supra
note 115. See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-505(d)(iv)–(v) (2007) (mandatory security freezes 
imposed by Wyoming’s UDAP law on credit reporting agencies do not apply to tenant 
screenings); State v. De Anza Corp., 416 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing 
exclusion of real estate transactions from previous version of statute as basis for excluding 
tenant-landlord issues from current statute). Though the inclusion of “real estate” in the 
definition of covered “trade or commerce” does appear to be an indicator that courts will 
read the statute as covering tenants more than the statute’s inclusion of “lease” transactions 
without specifically including real estate transactions. See, e.g., infra notes 163–64 and ac-
companying text (discussing Hawai’i jurisprudence).
152. See Davis v. Boydell Dev. Co., No. 16-011635-CZ, 2019 WL 2605789, at *5 (Mich. Ct. 
App. June 25, 2019).
153. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-303 (West 2018); NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.2.6.1; see
also, e.g., Scroggins v. Dahne, 645 A.2d 1160, 1164 (Md. 1994) (“We do not believe the legis-
lature intended the CPA to be applicable to statements or omissions concerning the leased 
premises occurring during the term of the lease.”) (quoting Richwind v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 
1147, 1158 (Md. 1994)).
154. See Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. PNR, Inc., 890 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2003); Equity Residential Props.
Tr. v. Yates, 910 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Wright v. Emory, 41 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. 2010).
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forcement actions targeting tenant abuse.155 On the other hand, 
New York courts have significantly limited UDAP’s application to 
tenant-landlord matters, but New York employs UDAP to protect 
tenants far more actively than any other state.156 Still, for obvious 
reasons, if a state’s UDAP law excludes tenants, that state’s con-
sumer protection agency is significantly less likely to take action to 
protect tenants.157
Courts limit the application of UDAP laws to tenants generally 
on one of two grounds: either tenant-landlord matters are not 
within the scope of “trade or commerce” covered by UDAP laws, or 
the state’s tenant-landlord laws displace UDAP as applied to ten-
ant-landlord-issues. These will be discussed in turn.
1. ‘Tenant-Landlord’ Transactions Fall Outside the Scope of 
Regulated Trade or Commerce
There are three primary bases on which courts deem tenant-
landlord transactions to fall beyond the scope of trade and com-
merce under UDAP. The first, and most common, is that rental 
transactions are not “trade or commerce” because they are a subset 
of real estate transactions. The second is that, in the residential 
rental context, UDAP applies only to points of sale, as opposed to 
the ongoing tenant-landlord relationship. The third is that tenant-
landlord issues are private conflicts outside of UDAP’s scope.
155. See infra Appendix A.
156. Under New York’s UDAP statute, consumers must not only prove individual injury 
but also that the conduct in question affects consumers more generally. Courts thus limit 
UDAP’s application to tenant issues on the basis that the conduct in question was not “con-
sumer-oriented conduct aimed at the public at large.” Aguaiza v. Vantage Props., LLC, 893 
N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). As such, a number of New York decisions categorize 
seemingly systemic tenant issues as not sufficiently “consumer-oriented” to fall within the 
scope of UDAP. See, e.g., State v. Bel Fior Hotel, 425 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(“We do not believe the provisions of a damage deposit clause in each of the 280 separate 
but identical contracts can be fairly be called ‘repeated’ or ‘persistent’ within the meaning 
of the statute.”); see also State v. Magley, 484 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“[W]e 
are unable to conclude that Special Term abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s re-
quest for an injunction . . . enjoining respondents from commencing proceedings to evict 
tenants not offered a one year lease . . . . Special term concluded under the circumstances of 
this particular case, injunctive relief was not appropriate since the legal and/or factual issues 
differed as to the various tenants and, therefore, could be better resolved in separate pro-
ceedings to which the tenants would be parties.”) Notably, in Magley, the court is specifically 
limiting the reach of the state in enforcing UDAP, stating that the conduct the state seeks to 
address would be better addressed through individual private lawsuits.
157. See infra Appendix A.
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a.  Residential Leasing Does Not Involve the Exchange of Goods or Services
Several courts restrict UDAP laws’ application to tenant-landlord 
relationships on the basis that real estate transactions, or transac-
tions centered around the conveyance of real property, fall outside 
the scope of trade and commerce covered by UDAP.158 The model 
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act somewhat endorses this ap-
proach.159 Such a stance evokes the historically prominent view, 
largely abandoned by scholars, that tenant-landlord matters should 
be adjudicated under “the special rules governing real property”
conveyances, rather than the laws regulating commerce.160
Hawai’i’s jurisprudence on the matter exemplifies this ap-
proach.161 Hawai’i’s UDAP statute affords standing only to “con-
sumers” and defines a consumer, in relevant part, as “a natural 
person who primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, 
purchases, attempts to purchase, or is solicited to purchase goods 
or services . . . .”162 “Purchase” is read to encompass “contract to 
buy,” “lease” and “contract to lease.”163
In Fernandez v. Mark Development, Inc., the court questioned
whether rental housing is a “good” and/or “service.”164 Concluding 
that it is neither, the court deferred to the historically dominant 
view of renting underlying caveat lessee—that rental transactions are
“real property” transactions, not “consumer” transactions.165 Again, 
to fall within the scope of regulated commerce, the transaction 
must involve either the sale of “goods” or “services.”166
158. See Thomas, supra note 145, § 3[c]; see NCLC, supra note 27, § 8.2.1.
159. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT § 2(1) cmt. (1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1970) 
(specifically recommending that real estate transactions be excluded from UDAP coverage, 
though on the basis that they are more appropriately regulated by separate real estate-
specific laws, thus demonstrating the futility in disentangling the rationales on which courts 
limit UDAP’s application to tenant matters).
160. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
161. See Souza v. Fisher, CAAP-12-0001699, 2017 WL 1293657, at *6–7 (Haw. Ct. App. 
Apr. 2, 2017) (citing Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 41 (Haw. 1995); Fer-
nandez v. Mark Dev. Inc., No. 29331, 2011 WL 5089808, at *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 
2011)).
162. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1, 480-13(b)(1) (2020). In addition, Hawai’i’s UDAP in-
cludes, in its definition of a consumer, one “who commits money, property, or services in a 
personal investment.” Id. § 480-1. Interestingly, Hawai’i courts interpret UDAP to encompass 
home purchases because buying a house is a “personal investment,” while renting a house, 
according to these courts, is not. This distinction exemplifies the narrow, and often disad-
vantageous, space tenants occupy under UDAP. Fernandez, 2011 WL 5089808, at *2 (Ct. App. 
2011).
163. Fernandez, 2011 WL 5089808, at *1.
164. 2011 WL 5089808, at *2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *1.
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To define “goods,”167 the court looked to Hawai’i’s Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC),168 which defines “goods” as tangible 
items: “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which 
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for 
sale . . . .” Because this definition seemingly does not include real 
property, the court held that rental transactions do not involve the 
purchase of goods.169
In evaluating whether renting property involves purchasing a 
“service,” the court stressed that the conveyance of property does 
not involve purchasing services: “The rental of real property ‘in-
volve[s] the transfer of a possessory interest in the real property for 
a period of time, in exchange of payment’ ” and the “rental 
agreement is a transfer of real property for a specified term, not a 
‘service’ under” UDAP.170 Interestingly, some courts appear more 
willing to apply the “real property” exemption to rental transac-
tions than transactions surrounding homeownership. 171
Other courts exclude tenants based on expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius—the canon of interpretation that the inclusion of one 
thing implies the exclusion of another.172 In Roberson v. Southwood 
Manor Associates, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court held
UDAP does not apply to rental transactions, in part because the 
UDAP law, in enumerating per se violations, does not include vio-
lations of tenant-landlord law.173 Though the court conceded that 
the referenced list is non-exhaustive, it interpreted the exclusion of 
tenant-landlord/real property from the enumerations as indicative 
of legislative intent.174
Such reasoning illustrates a contrasting approach between 
courts who hold UDAP applicable to tenants and those who do 
not. The “not-apply” courts are more likely to apply strict construc-
tionist modes of interpretation, relying on the narrow and tech-
nical definition of terms.175 The “apply” courts, in contrast, inter-
pret UDAPs’ scope as broad and flexible, focusing more on the 
policy behind UDAP than strict textualism.176 As stated by one such 
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id. (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13(b)(1)).
169. Id.
170. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
171. See Fernandez, 2011 WL 5089808; Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
Compare, e.g., Keiber v. Spicer Constr. Co., 619 N.E.2d 1105, 1108–09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) 
(home construction contract regulated by Ohio’s UDAP), with Heritage Hills v. Deacon 551 
N.E.2d 125, 128 (Ohio 1990) (tenant-landlord matters excluded from Ohio’s UDAP).
172. See, e.g., Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC, 249 P.3d 1059, 1060–61 
(Alaska 2011).
173. Id. at 1063.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., id.
176. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 477–480 (1974).
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court, “it is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all un-
fair practices . . . . Even if all known practices were specifically pro-
hibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again.”177
b. Tenant-Landlord Matters Are Not Sufficiently Transactional to 
Fall Within UDAP
Courts may limit UDAP law application to tenant-landlord mat-
ters that take place within the on-going tenant-landlord relation-
ship and instead only apply UDAP to points of sale. Multiple Mary-
land decisions, for example, hold that UDAP does not regulate 
habitability concerns arising after lease formation.178 In Scroggins v. 
Dahne, a tenant sued her landlord under Maryland’s UDAP law, ar-
guing that the landlord committed an illegal trade practice by 
renting her an apartment with peeling lead paint.179 At least in 
part, however, because the paint began to peel after lease for-
mation, the court ruled UDAP inapplicable:
[In Richwind,] [w]e held instead that [t]he CPA applies to a 
lease at the time the consumer enters into it, and the Act is 
intended to govern deceptive trade practices which induce 
the prospective tenant to enter into such a lease . . . . As the 
chipping or peeling paint did not exist at the time the lease 
was entered into, the landlord could not be said to have 
engaged in a deceptive trade practice under the CPA.180
Tellingly, while Maryland is more active than most states in using 
UDAP to protect tenants, Maryland’s consumer enforcement suits 
focus on discrete deceptive transactions—the charging of illegal 
fees, the illegal withholding of security deposits, and the like—
rather than, for example, ongoing habitability concerns.181
177. Id. at 463 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142 (1914)).
178. Scroggins v. Dahne, 645 A.2d 1160, 1164 (citing Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. 
Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), overruled by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 
835 A.2d 616 (Md. 2003)). By overruling Richwind, Brooks seems to overrule Scroggins in 
principle.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 696 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
181. See infra Appendix A (citing Stacey J. Hawkins v. Reg’l Mgmt., Inc., No. 2550 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 19, 2018)); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen. Attorney General Frosh Sues 
Landlords for Defrauding Rental Applicants (Apr. 18, 2016); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., 
Attorney General Frosh Announces Settlement With Homes Direct, Inc. (June 22, 2006);
Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., AG Gansler: Developer of Unbuilt Retirement Community for 
Veterans in Baltimore Co. Must Reimburse Deposits to Applicants (June 3, 2014); Press Re-
lease, Md. Att’y Gen., AG Gansler Announces Settlement With Property Manager (Sept. 26, 
2013); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., AG Gansler’s Consumer Protection Division Settles 
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A federal district court, interpreting Illinois’s UDAP law, was 
even more explicit in holding that incidents within an ongoing 
tenant-landlord relationship are not part of regulated trade or 
commerce.182 While Illinois’s UDAP law generally applies to tenant-
landlord matters,183 the court held it did not apply to an allegedly 
illegal eviction because the “eviction of Plaintiff was not ‘advertis-
ing,’ ‘offering for sale,’ ‘sale,’ or ‘distribution,’ and thus did not 
qualify as trade or commerce under the Act.”184 Such reasoning 
tends not to entirely foreclose UDAP’s application to tenant mat-
ters, but rather limit it to discrete transaction points.
c.  Tenant-Landlord Issues Are Private Matters, Not “Consumer” Matters
Courts may also limit UDAP’s application to tenant matters on 
the basis that tenant-landlord issues are too localized or private to 
truly exist within trade or commerce. In some such cases, courts 
merely analyze whether UDAP applies, for example, to disputes be-
tween roommates, a distinct scenario which will not be further dis-
cussed here.185
Charges of Fabricated Damage Claims Against Prince George’s Co. Apartment Owner (Mar. 
21, 2012); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Gansler Settles with Property 
Management Company: JPI Apartment Management Agrees to Stop Charging Certain Fees 
(Oct. 16, 2008); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Settles with Three Property 
Management Companies (Feb. 6, 2007); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General 
Settles with Property Management Company: Associated Estates Realty Corporation Agrees 
to Stop Charging Certain Fees (Jan. 26, 2007).
182. Falk v. Perez, 973 F.Supp.2d 850, 868 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
183. See e.g., Anast v. Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Pet-
rauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Mgmt., Inc., 542 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Carter v. 
Mueller, 457 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People ex rel. Fahner v. Testa, 445 N.E.2d 
1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982). See also Brown v. Veile, 555 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
184. Falk, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (quoting 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1(f)). Falk,
however, may not actually deter Illinois’s Consumer Fraud Bureau from bringing UDAP 
claims to challenge illegal evictions. Illinois brought and successfully settled one of the 
higher profile UDAP claims on behalf of tenants. Press Release, Illinois Att’y Gen., Madigan 
Announces $1 Million Settlement with Safeguard Properties (June 3, 2015),
https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_06/20150603.html [https://perma.cc
/9VAD-EBH3].
That said, other states may be hesitant to bring UDAP tenant-protection actions based 
on activity that sounds less in classic deception. See Simpson v. Yonts, 197 Ga. App. 311 
(1990) (holding that landlord’s failure to repair fuse box does not rise to the level of and 
unfair or deceptive act even if it constitutes a breach of landlord’s duty to repair); Pelleteri 
v. Caspian Grp., Inc., 851 So. 2d 1230, 1241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003); McCormack v. Brower, 
948 A.2d 1259 (Me. 2008); Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471 (2006).
185. Billings v. Wilson, 493 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1986); Sayah v. Hatzipetro, 492 N.E.2d 
1131 (Mass. 1986); Neihaus v. Maxwell, 766 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Young v. 
Patukonis, 506 N.E.2d 1164 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). See also NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.2.6.3, 
n.1130 (collecting cases). While these instances are not central to this article, it does bear 
mentioning that it would be somewhat anomalous for a consumer fraud bureau not to pur-
sue action against a landlord because the landlord runs only a small operation, as data sug-
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Other decisions, however, limit the application of UDAP to ten-
ant matters in more pertinent ways.186 According to some such de-
cisions, the tenant-landlord relationship is presumptively private, as 
opposed to being part of the regulated marketplace.187 Multiple 
New York courts have taken this view.188 In one case, for example, a 
New York court characterized tenant accusations of a larger land-
lord’s allegedly widespread efforts to force tenants to prematurely 
leave the property as “only private disputes between landlords and 
tenants, and not consumer-oriented conduct aimed at the public at 
large, as required by statute.”189
2.  Tenant-Landlord Law Displaces UDAP as Applied to Tenants
Another commonly cited basis for courts to restrict UDAP’s ap-
plication to tenants is that tenant matters are governed by a sepa-
rate set of laws which, according to such courts, displace UDAP’s
application to tenant-landlord matters. The commentary to the 
Uniform UDAP statute adopts this view: “On the assumption that 
land transactions frequently are, and should be, regulated by spe-
cialized legislation, they are excluded altogether.”190
The notion that tenant-landlord law displaces UDAP is based in 
a broad application of the principle that conduct cannot violate 
UDAP where it is sanctioned by more specific laws. In most states, 
courts read this exemption narrowly: if a more specific statute ex-
plicitly permits certain conduct, UDAP cannot be read to prohibit 
such conduct.191 Other courts, however, read this exemption quite 
broadly: if an industry is subject to a specific regulatory scheme, 
then businesses within that industry are categorically exempt from 
gests consumer fraud bureaus most frequently bring actions against small operations. Cox et 
al., supra note 29, at 61–62. That said, a landlord running a small operation for profit is dis-
tinct from a homeowner renting to a roommate. But see PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., 
842 So.2d 773 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]hen considered with the other provisions of the FDUTPA 
[Florida’s UDAP], it is clear that the prohibition is broad enough to protect against instanc-
es of unfair or deceptive conduct as to a single party or under a single transaction or con-
tract . . . . The very provisions that outline the parameters for individual remedies under the 
FDUTPA are triggered by the commission of a single act.”). Though, again, it is exceedingly 
unlikely that an enforcement agency would target or even know about such isolated instanc-
es.
186. NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.2.6.
187. Id.
188. See cases cited supra note 156.
189. Aguaiza v. Vantage Props., LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
190. Heritage Hills v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ohio 1990) (quoting UNIF.
CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT § 2(1) cmt. (1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N. 1970).
191. NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.3.3.1.
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UDAP.192 Again, the specific language of the UDAP statute is not 
necessarily outcome determinative.193
Heritage Hills v. Deacon exemplifies how courts may broadly apply 
this exemption to exclude tenant-landlord matters from UDAP 
coverage.194 There, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether 
lease clauses seemingly abrogating the landlord’s duty to make re-
pairs violate UDAP.195 To answer this question, the court analyzed
whether Ohio’s UDAP statute applies to tenant-landlord matters at 
all, and concluded it does not.196 Importantly, the court cited no 
exemption of otherwise regulated conduct within the text of 
Ohio’s UDAP and conceded that “the Act does not specifically ex-
clude a lease of real property.”197 Still, the court argued that the 
tenant-landlord code should displace UDAP in regulating tenant-
landlord matters:
This specific statutory scheme for resolving landlord-tenant 
disputes would appear to exclude application of [UDAP] to 
residential leases . . . . Clearly, the Consumer Protection Act 
covers a very broad area of transactions; whereas, the Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act covers one very specific 
small area of transactions, and is complete within itself for 
that area. We therefore must conclude that for all transac-
tions within its purview the Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act controls and preempts the field. 198
Such cases illustrate the narrow space tenant-consumers are 
forced to occupy under state regulatory regimes. Indeed, in many 
instances, when an industry is regulated by a separate regulatory 
scheme, there is a state or federal agency who enforces that 
scheme. Tenants are excluded from UDAP enforcement because 
they are regulated by another set of laws, but there is generally no 
state or federal agency tasked with enforcing those laws.199 In this 
sense, tenants neither have their cake nor eat it.200
192. Id.
193. Compare Heritage Hills, 551 N.E.2d at 127 (excluding tenant-landlord matters with-
out citing UDAP provision exempting transactions permitted by other laws), with, e.g.,
Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill.App.3d 314 (1983) (interpreting Illinois’s UDAP to apply to ten-
ant-landlord matter though Illinois UDAP contains no such explicit language).
194. Heritage Hills, 551 N.E.2d at 127.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 127–28.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 128 (quoting Chelsea Plaza Homes v. Moore, 601 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Kan. 
1979)).
199. Nathan Tempey, The Case for Licensing Landlords, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://gothamist.com/news/the-case-for-licensing-landlords [https://perma.cc/V47R-
NVGG]; Frasier Sherman, Can I Buy Houses Then Rent Them Out Without a Real Estate License?, 
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In Davis, for example, the Michigan Appellate Court upheld the 
trial court’s decision excluding tenants from UDAP coverage based 
upon Michigan’s regulated industries exemption which excludes 
from coverage “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized 
under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting 
under statutory authority of this state or the United States.”201 The 
problem is no state or federal board or agency regulates Michigan 
landlords; rather, the court relies on Michigan’s home rule struc-
ture, which empowers counties to regulate landlords.202 As a result, 
in Michigan, the state consumer protection agency cannot protect 
tenants, as they are excluded from UDAP coverage, but there is no 
state agency taking their place, leaving tenants in a regulatory no 
man’s land.203
Further, unless they are based upon explicit statutory language, 
decisions like the Ohio court’s are hard to square with UDAP’s
general prohibition of “unfair” conduct: violation of public policy 
is a key factor in determining unfairness.204 In states like Ohio,205
violations of tenant-landlord law are seemingly exempt from UDAP 
for the exact reason such conduct is “unfair” under UDAP—
because it violates public policy.206 It is similarly counterintuitive for 
business conduct to be exempt from UDAP coverage because it is 
illegal.207 Regardless, several jurisdictions exclude tenants from 
UDAP on this basis.
LEGALBEAGLE.COM, https://legalbeagle.com/13593692-can-i-buy-houses-then-rent-them-out-
without-a-real-estate-license.html [https://perma.cc/ERB8-L3SC]. Contrast to, for example,
the roofing industry which, in many states, is regulated by a specific licensing board, as well 
as local inspectors and permit boards. Contractor Licensing Requirements – State by State, HOME 
ADVISOR (2019), https://www.homeadvisor.com/r/state-by-state-licensing-requirements/
[https://perma.cc/H39P-BUVN.].
200. Compare Davis v. Boydell Dev. Co., Inc., No. 16-011635-CZ, 2019 WL 2605789, at *4 
(Mich. Ct. App. June 25, 2019) (per curiam) (excluding tenants from UDAP coverage based 
on Michigan’s regulated industries exemption), with 49 Prospect Street Tenants Ass’n v. 
Sheva Gardens, Inc., 547 A.2d 1134 (N.J. 1988) (distinguishing inclusion of tenant-landlord 
matters in UDAP with exclusion of securities matters on the partial basis that securities mat-
ters are overseen by a specifically delegated regulatory agency).
201. See Davis, 2019 WL 265789, at *4.
202. See id. (noting that Michigan leaves the regulation of landlord licensing to munici-
palities).
203. See id.
204. NCLC, supra note 27, § 4.3.3.3.1.
205. Ohio’s UDAP statute prohibits both deceptive and unfair practices and defers to 
FTC guidance and definitions. OHIO REG. CODE 1345.02. The FTC, like most states, includes 
violation of public policy as a factor in determining statutory unfairness. NCLC, supra note 
27, § 4.3.3.3.1.
206. NCLC, supra note 27, § 4.3.3.3.1.
207. In Conaway v. Prestia, for example, the Superior Court of Connecticut, relying on 
the FTC guidance treating violation of public policy as a factor is assessing unfairness, held 
that a landlord committed an unfair act by violating legal licensing requirements but collect-
ing rent anyway. 464 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1983). The court stressed the landlord’s violation of 
other regulations made the conduct more, not less, likely to be unfair under UDAP. Ex-
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B.  Sociological Explanations 
Consumer enforcement agencies’ approach to tenant issues re-
flects the greater social structures in which these agencies exist.208 
Tenants, as a demographic, have less power and resources than 
other consumer classes—for example, homeowners.209 Less power-
ful groups tend to receive less attention from the government.210 
This is not to say that individuals at consumer enforcement agen-
cies have any disregard for tenants. Rather, it applies a basic prin-
ciple of much sociological thought—that individual institutions re-
flect the larger social structures in which they are situated.211 This 
principle helps explain, for example, why code enforcement is so 
chronically underfunded.212 
Indeed, one would expect tenants to receive less consumer 
agency attention, especially compared to their homeowning coun-
terparts. Compared to homeowners, tenants have significantly less 
money,213 are members of age demographics less likely to vote,214 
                                                   
panding on Conaway, in Gaylord v. Mosher, the court held that a landlord committed statuto-
ry unfairness by locking tenants out of their home, in violation of the state’s landlord-tenant 
ordinance.  1991 WL 253709, at *3 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1991). Again, citing FTC guidance, the 
court stated that “[t]hese violations offended public policy and therefore constituted a 
CUTPA [Connecticut’s UDAP Statute] violation.”  Id. 
 208. Kathryn Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants Rights, 27 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 97, 130–31 (2019) (“The underenforcement of housing standards is a classic case of 
‘underenforcement’ on behalf of communities that have not been a political priority . . . . 
[P]oor people do not enjoy law enforcement resources in proportion to their numbers in 
the population . . . . Underenforcement is ‘a form of social disinvestment’ . . . . State and 
federal actors equipped with more resources could pursue certain categories of housing 
conditions enforcement, but, perhaps for the same reasons that the local agencies are un-
der-resourced, the better-funded government units have devoted relatively little attention to 
the concerns of poor tenants.”). This social disinvestment is not an accusation of mal-intent 
against agency employees and leaders, but rather a statement about the sociological forces 
necessarily reflected in a society’s institutions. 
 209. Homeowners vs Renters Statistics, IPROPERTY MGMT. (Feb. 2020), https://iproperty
management.com/renters-vs-homeowners-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/3696-ATWX]. 
 210. Sabbeth, supra note 208, at 130. 
 211. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE 
THEORY OF STRUCTURATION xxiii–xxvi (1984). 
 212. Sabbeth, supra note 208, at 130. 
 213. Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, 
https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/quick-facts-figures/quick-facts-resident-
demographics (click “U.S. Household Incomes”) (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 214. Renters are younger than homeowners and older demographics are more likely to 
vote. See Jordan Misra, Voter Turnout Rates Among All Voting Age and Major Racial and Ethnic 
Groups Were Higher Than in 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-states-midterm-
election-turnout.html [https://perma.cc/KQ9P-TB4T]; Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, 
NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/quick-facts-
figures/quick-facts-resident-demographics (click “Renters and Owners”) (last visited Feb. 5, 
2021) (noting that tenants are younger than homeowners). 
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and have a much higher rate of transience.215 Tenant issues also 
have a disproportionate effect on socially disadvantaged groups 
such as racial minorities and women.216 In Evicted, Desmond docu-
ments how Black women likely experienced the brunt of the rental 
crisis.217 Thus, though the rental crisis has been worse than the 
foreclosure crisis,218 and the foreclosure crisis was worse for renters 
than homeowners,219 it is no surprise that homeowners receive 
more attention than renters.
Such inequities are likely reproduced in the structure of con-
sumer enforcement agencies themselves.220 Most agencies rely on 
consumer complaints, thus disadvantaging vulnerable tenants fear-
ing retaliation or those with less technological access to the com-
plaint process.221 Problems homeowners face with mortgage banks 
likely stem from the standardized practices of large institutions, 
which make it more difficult to aggregate tenant issues for en-
forcement purposes.222
Further, differences between mortgage-lending and rental insti-
tutions may make it more difficult for bureaus to bring enforce-
ment actions against the latter. Indeed, it is no surprise that more 
vulnerable populations do business with smaller and less visible en-
tities, which are, in turn, more difficult for the government to hold 
accountable. For example, it is easier for landlords to dodge en-
forcement than it is for, say, Bank of America. Absentee landlords 
may be hard for law enforcement to locate or take meaningful ac-
tion against. There are no absentee mortgage banks. Similarly, for 
215. Compare IPROPERTY MGMT., supra note 209 (noting that 54% of rental households 
turnover from year to year), with Stephanie Booth, Should I Sell My House? 6 Signs It’s Time to 
Move On, REALTOR.COM (July 10, 2019), https://www.realtor.com/advice/sell/how-long-
should-you-live-in-your-home-before-selling [https://perma.cc/95KQ-JDCW] (stating aver-
age homeowners stays in home for 10 years).
216. Terrence McCoy, Eviction Isn’t Just About Poverty. It’s Also About Race — and Virginia 
Proves It, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/social-issues/eviction-isnt-just-about-poverty-its-also-about-race—and-virginia-proves-
it/2018/11/10/475be8ae-d7bd-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html [https://perma.cc
/G78G-PPPE]; DESMOND, supra note 24, at 98.
217. Id.
218. Supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
219. Id.
220. These class differences between tenants and homeowners also manifest themselves 
through the jurisprudence and statutory language just discussed in Section II.A. See, e.g.,
Fernandez v. Mark Dev., 2011 WL 5089808, at *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011). For exam-
ple, in Fernandez, the Hawai’i appellate court held that because Hawai’i’s UDAP protects 
personal investments but not real property transactions, rental transactions fall outside 
UDAP, though home sales do not. Id.
221. See DESMOND, supra note 24, at 186-–192 (noting, for example, that tenants facing 
domestic violence forego calling the police for fear of alerting the landlord to the disturb-
ance and facing eviction).
222. See, e.g., Complaint at *51, United States v. Bank of Am., 12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. 
2012), http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/files/Complaint_Corrected_2012-03-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TPF-HMRT].
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obvious reasons, it is less likely for mortgage banks to be judgment 
proof than small-time landlords. While mortgage banks are by no 
means a paragon of trustworthiness and accountability, at least 
consumer fraud bureaus can find them and collect from them.
Thus, consumer enforcement agencies are less likely to respond 
strongly to the crises affecting tenants than those affecting home-
owners because tenant vulnerability is less noticeable and harder to 
enforce. Indeed, tenants have faced severe affordability problems
on and off since World War II.223 While this crisis has spiked in re-
cent years, it is not new for tenants to face frequent hardship. On 
the other hand, homeowners’ widespread default on mortgages 
was shocking, sudden, and, therefore, far more noticeable.224 The 
invention and popularity of mortgage-backed securities stemmed 
from the common sentiment of: “Who the hell doesn’t pay their 
mortgage”?225 As such, it is easier for agencies to view the Foreclo-
sure Crisis as a “crisis” in the true sense—a sharp and damaging 
deviation from the norm. It is easier for the plight of low-income 
tenants to fly beneath the radar.
C. Institutional Factors
To better understand why consumer protection agencies do not 
treat tenant protection as central to their mandates, the author in-
terviewed representatives from ten state consumer protection bu-
reaus.226 Importantly, this Article does not purport to be a quantita-
tive study. The author spoke to the bureaus to get better insight 
into the range of institutional factors and norms influencing agen-
cy treatment of tenant matters.227
223. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450 (1974).
224. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 4 (Jan. 
27, 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7TJ-D7CK].
225. Cezary Podkul, The Regrets of Lewis Ranieri, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-regrets-of-lewis-ranieri-1536240610 [https://perma.cc
/7K3W-FBLY]; Paramount, The Big Short Opening Scene, YOUTUBE (2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDjjsCunnhI.
226. Representatives from the consumer financial protection bureaus of the following 
states were interviewed: Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, Idaho, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Connecticut, Arkansas, Vermont, and Indiana. There was no exact science to the states in-
terviewed for this article, as much of it depended on which states were willing to participate.
The interviews tended to focus on states that brought few if any enforcement actions regard-
ing tenant issues, did not have clear jurisprudence excluding tenants from UDAP, and had a 
relatively high ratio of complaints regarding tenant landlord issues based on their published 
lists, though, in some instances, the interviews themselves cast some doubt on the applicabil-
ity of these criteria.
227. Analysis of the interviews begins with premise that the agencies interviewed do not 
prioritize tenant protection in their enforcement efforts. This does not necessarily reflect 
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In speaking to these individuals, most acknowledged that their 
offices do not often bring enforcement actions aimed at protecting 
tenants. They provided the following rationales:228 (1) Common 
tenant issues are not transactional in nature or are not core ‘con-
sumer’ issues; (2) Matter regulated by another entity and/or set of 
laws and/or other resources available; and (3) Lack of actionable 
consumer complaints from tenants.
In many ways, these rationales parallel judicial rationales for lim-
iting UDAP’s application to tenants—that real estate issues are not 
consumer issues, that landlord-tenant law displaces UDAP, and 
that tenant-landlord issues are private disputes and, thus, do not 
truly exist within the stream of commerce as regulated by UDAP. 
That said, consumer bureaus were less likely to frame these issues 
in jurisprudential terms and more likely to discuss them as logisti-
cal impediments.229 These factors will be discussed in turn below.
1.  Tenant-Landlord Issues Are Not Core Consumer Issues
In some instances, interviewees indicated that tenants’ issues 
were not core “consumer” issues, at least not of the type central to 
the agency’s mandate.
One manifestation of this view is that the primary mandate of 
consumer bureaus is to police the market for scams—
misrepresentations which generally take place at a transaction 
point—rather than to regulate the on-going relationship between 
tenant and landlord. One representative, for example, stated that 
while the office may take on tenant cases that more closely resem-
ble classic scams, for example, where the landlord advertises amen-
ities that are not actually present:
the view of those interviewed but is, rather, based upon the small number of lawsuits or offi-
cial settlements regarding tenant-landlord matters. See infra Appendix A.
228. Two other factors which received very brief attention from a small number of offic-
es were the notion that consumer bureau regulation of landlords could have adverse market 
consequences for tenants (“[C]onsumer bureau intervention would result in landlords be-
having as follows: Yep, we’re gonna make all these fixes. And you know what, our rent’s go-
ing to go up.”) and fear of making bad law (noting that office makes non-litigation efforts to 
help tenants and noting that a court decision could strip them of authority to do so: 
“[M]aybe we’ve never brought a seminal case because we just want to keep our power as 
is.”).
229. For example, one representative stated that their office was unlikely to get involved 
in habitability matters regulated by housing codes, not because, as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation, these codes displaced UDAP, but because it was a more efficient division of 
labor for code enforcement to handle such matters. See Interview with Daniel Mosteller, 
Special Deputy Att’y Gen., N.C. Dep’t Just. Consumer Prot. Div., at 20:20 (Aug. 9, 2019) 
[hereinafter North Carolina Interview] (on file with author).
702 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:3
[I]f it’s landlord harassment, that’s not going to meet our 
standards, because there’s not going to be a misrepresenta-
tion or omission . . . . So [changes] in lease terms . . . don’t
really meet our standards, unless there’s some misrepresen-
tation that is being made along with it, and it relates to the 
transaction itself. It’s all centered around the actual trans-
action.230
This same representative stated that the office was also less likely 
to cover habitability issues because such issues did not revolve 
around “deceptive statements . . . . And . . . if those aren’t . . . pre-
sent, we would have difficulty bringing an enforcement action 
within our office.”231 This view was stated perhaps most bluntly by a
representative from another state office: “[Tenant-landlord is] def-
initely not the core of what [the state UDAP statute] is meant to 
be.”232
The just-quoted office elaborated that their priorities were in-
formed by the enumerated industries listed in the UDAP statute 
they enforced.233 This office noted that the enumerated list of in-
dustries the office could regulate under UDAP was not exhaus-
tive.234 Still, when asked whether there was “a particular hesitance 
or logistical impediment” to the office being more active on ten-
ants issues, the office responded “I think you just look at the stat-
ute . . . . So if I take a look at the index, it shows what is core to the 
CPA. We get assistive technology, lead and children’s product safe-
ty, musical performances, fair credit reporting, credit card compa-
nies, structured settlements, unlicensed loans.”235
Somewhat in contrast to the approach expressed above—that 
classic deception takes place at transaction points—some offices 
stated that tenant-landlord matters more resemble contract dis-
putes than consumer fraud. As one deputy attorney general ex-
plained, if a tenant-landlord complaint alleges deceptive or mis-
leading conduct or an unfair business practice, “it might fall under 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.”236 Such complaints, accord-
230. Interview with Betsy DeNardi, Dir. Consumer Prot. Div, Off. Ind. Att’y Gen. Con-
sumer Prot. Div., at 9:56 (July 31, 2019) [hereinafter Indiana Interview] (on file with au-
thor).
231. Id.
232. See Interview with Emp., Vt. Off. Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Unit (July 23, 2019)




236. Interview with Stephanie N. Guyon, Deputy Att’y Gen., Idaho Att’y Gen. Off. (July
18, 2019) [hereinafter Idaho Interview] (on file with author).  This somewhat inverts the 
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ing to the Deputy Attorney General, usually involve misrepresenta-
tions in a rental advertisement.237 In contrast, other tenant-landlord 
complaints raise issues governed by “the lease agreement,” which is 
“subject to traditional contract law adjudication,” not the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act.238 In other words, “simply because you 
don’t perform the way your contract requires you to perform 
doesn’t mean that you’re engaging in an unfair or deceptive prac-
tice.”239 Under this approach, “consumer protections” are more 
likely to serve as a backstop for matters not addressed by contract.
To summarize, agencies may be hesitant to prioritize tenant is-
sues because they are not “core” consumer issues. This can be ex-
pressed as a political-linguistic point—that many tenant-landlord 
issues are not encompassed by the commonly held interpretation 
of “consumer fraud.” It can also be understood as expressing an 
underlying concern regarding administrative overreach—that the 
agency should impose limits on the scope of its regulation based 
on industries enumerated in the statute, even if such enumerations 
are not exhaustive. An underlying assumption of this rationale may 
be that it is inefficient for consumer bureaus to dedicate significant 
resources towards tenant issues when other resources exist specifi-
cally to help tenants. How resource allocation plays into such 
agency decisions will be discussed in the following subsection.
2.  Tenant-Landlord Matters Regulated Through Separate 
Mechanisms/Concerns of Resource Allocation
As discussed in Section II.A.2, courts limiting UDAP application 
to tenant-landlord issues often do so on the basis that UDAP laws 
are displaced by specific tenant-landlord codes. Consumer agen-
cies may adopt a similar view, but one founded more on concerns 
about resource allocation and logistics. Consumer agencies may be 
hesitant to prioritize tenant-landlord issues because other re-
sources are available to tenants. For example, there is a distinct 
tenant-landlord statutory scheme and eviction process, government 
agencies exist specifically to help tenants, and Legal Aid tradition-
ally allocates significant resources toward eviction prevention.240
notion that consumer issues are transactional, as some issues are not truly ‘consumer’ issues 




240. See Suggested List of Priorities for LSC Recipients, LEGAL SERV. CORP. (May 20, 1996), 
https://www.lsc.gov/suggested-list-priorities-lsc-recipients [https://perma.cc/CKP6-8HYZ].
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Paralleling the reasoning in the above subsection, some state 
consumer enforcement attorneys expressed that their bureaus’
lack of specifically enumerated authority to enforce tenant-
landlord law indicates that they may not, or should not, prioritize 
tenant issues. As noted by a representative of one bureau in ex-
plaining why they brought few tenant-protection suits, “Well, we’re 
not specifically referenced in the Landlord Tenant Act.” 241
Another office takes its cues from the fact that tenant-landlord 
laws exist as part of a statutory scheme distinct from that which the 
consumer protection bureau enforces. A deputy attorney general 
with the office further explained that “even though leasing and 
renting” is a business practice that falls within the Consumer Pro-
tection Act, leasing and renting issues specific to the tenant-
landlord relationship are covered under the state’s tenant-landlord 
laws, which the office does not enforce.242
Some offices stated that, because tenants are protected by dis-
tinct statutory regimes and have other resources available, it is a 
more efficient division of labor for other entities to focus on help-
ing tenants: “We’re not code enforcement . . . . They can deal with 
[tenant issues] in a lot quicker timeline.”243 As stated by a repre-
sentative of one bureau in explaining why the office seldom 
brought enforcement actions regarding tenant-landlord issues:244
Because there’s the Department of Housing, because 
there’s housing court, because there’s the Department of 
Economic and Community Development, because there’s
Section Eight and the local entities that service Section 
Eight, because there are other entities that actually service 
housing concerns. And we’re not operationally set up for 
these cases, because we wouldn’t be bringing the case on 
behalf of a tenant when tenants are usually calling. They 
want something now, something’s gone wrong in their 
property, their landlord is acting a certain way. And they 
want the problem fixed, either, you know, abated rent, or 
to take better care of the property no matter what it is. 
241. Interview with Kelly Rainsford, Deputy of Regul. Enf’t, S.C. Dep’t of Consumer Affs.
(Aug. 8, 2019) [hereinafter South Carolina Interview] (on file with author).
242. Idaho Interview supra note 236. Notably, some agencies cited court decisions out-
side of the tenant-landlord context towards the principle that their office was not permitted 
to “bootstrap” violation of other laws as a basis for a UDAP violation unless specifically enu-
merated by UDAP. See, e.g., Interview with Benjamin E. Bellus, Assistant Att’y Gen., Consum-
er Prot. Div., Iowa Att’y Gen. Off. (Aug. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Iowa Interview] (on file with 
author).
243. North Carolina Interview, supra note 229.
244. Interview with Julianne Avalone, Legal Dir., State of Conn., Dep’t of Consumer 
Prot. (July 25, 2019) [hereinafter Connecticut Interview] (on file with author).
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They’re usually calling and the city or some other state 
agency that specializes in housing, that can mediate on 
their behalf, or resolve the issue directly with the landlord. 
As you know, whether it’s often the city coming out and 
taking care of the blight and then putting a lien on the 
property; whatever that is we don’t have that immediate 
remedy.
Some representatives even stated quite explicitly that hesitance 
to prioritize tenant issues is “primarily a resource issue.”245 One at-
torney noted candidly that if the office prioritized tenant issues, it 
“could open a floodgate and we don’t have the resources . . . . I
would be doing nothing else [but tenant issues] and would still fall 
behind.”246 Indeed, evictions and the like are so prevalent that they 
are regulated by a distinct legal regime and subject to a unique 
court procedure. If consumer bureaus prioritized such matters, the 
thinking goes, it would fundamentally alter their mission such that 
they could no longer afford to take action against traditional 
scams. According to those espousing this line of reasoning, such a 
shift in mission would be inefficient, especially where code en-
forcement, HUD, and Legal Aid are already tasked with assisting 
tenants.
3.  Lack of Tenant Complaints
Perhaps more than any other single factor, consumer protection 
attorneys cited lack of actionable tenant complaints as the reason 
their bureaus do not bring more enforcement actions on behalf of 
tenants.247 One state agency, for example, received only eight com-
plaints from 2014 through Summer 2019.248 The representative of 
this bureau recalled, for example, that in one instance, they re-
ceived a media report of a landlord renting to students who would 
illegally increase rent at the last minute, but the office did not take 
enforcement action because it received no complaints from the 
245. Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
246. Id.
247. Interview with Katharyn Barron, Mich. Dep’t Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Div. (July
29, 2019) [hereinafter Michigan Interview] (on file with author) (“The biggest reason rela-
tive to a lack of enforcement in that area is we don’t see a lot of complaints.”).
248. South Carolina Interview, supra note 241. As discussed elsewhere in this article, 
however, even where there is a quantitatively small number of tenant complaints, this may 
be a reflection of office structure as much as tenant desire to file complaints. For example, 
this office representative stated, “We don’t get a lot of . . . landlord-tenant complaints . . .
partly because they might call ahead of time and . . . tell us what the issue is . . . and we refer 
them before they ever . . . file an actual complaint with us.” Id.
706 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:3
aggrieved consumers.249 A representative of another bureau sought 
to explain the low quantity of tenant complaints by inferring that 
even if the agency considered tenant issues to be core consumer 
issues, tenants themselves would not intuitively think to turn to a 
consumer agency: “[I]t’s possible that people don’t realize they 
could bring their complaints to the Attorney General’s office . . . .
[P]eople think about coming to our office when . . . they’ve been 
scammed and not for something that they think . . . isn’t . . . a scam 
[like if] they’re frustrated with . . . [their] landlords.”250
More commonly, though, representatives noted that it was the 
quality, not quantity, of tenant complaints that limited the agency’s
ability to bring enforcement actions. After all, tenant complaints 
are one of the most common complaints to consumer enforce-
ment bureaus.251 Several bureau representatives noted that they re-
ceive many complaints from tenants, but that such complaints tend 
to be too individuated to generate escalated enforcement efforts.252
Noting that their office took on systemic consumer issues, as op-
posed to representing individual consumers, one representative
stated that, while they received a significant number of tenant 
complaints, tenant issues were often “very individualized and fact 
dependent” and thus not “super conducive to the type of cases we 
bring.”253 Several bureaus said tenant complaints often constituted 
“one-offs.”
Agencies find it more difficult to assist tenants when their com-
plaints appear more intensely fact dependent. It may be difficult, 
for example, for a consumer enforcement agency to help tenants 
being threatened with illegal eviction; doing so would require the 
agency to gage which eviction threats were illegal and to navigate 
inevitably conflicting accounts of interactions and transactions be-
tween the tenant and landlord.
Representatives of several bureaus noted that, in other indus-
tries, a single act of consumer fraud is likely to affect a large num-
ber of consumers in a fairly uniform way.254 Thus, landlord practic-
249. Id.
250. Indiana Interview, supra note 230.
251. For example, per annual Consumer Federation of America Surveys, every year, 
from 2019 to 2012, landlord-tenant issues were among the top ten issues complained of to 
state consumer enforcement bureaus. E.g., CONSUMER FED. OF AM., CONSUMER COMPLAINT 
SURVEY REPORT 2019, at 5 (2020), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07
/Top-Consumer-Complaints-Report-7-27-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q2W-DVG8]; 
CONSUMER FED. OF AM., 2012 CONSUMER COMPLAINT SURVEY REPORT, at 5 (2013), 
https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/top-10-consumer-complaints-07-31-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CU7N-NS2E].
252. See, e.g., North Carolina Interview, supra note 229; Michigan Interview, supra note 
247; Indiana Interview, supra note 230; Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
253. North Carolina Interview, supra note 229.
254. E.g., id.
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es analogous to traditional “scams”—such as false advertising or 
systemic confiscation of security deposits—are more practical for 
consumer divisions than ongoing issues faced by tenants over the 
course of the lease.255 One bureau representative noted that they 
would be more likely to take action if a landlord falsely promised 
refrigerators to a complex of tenant units, than if a landlord failed 
to complete a number of disparate repairs over a prolonged period 
of time.256
As such, the lack of complaints, the individualized nature of the 
complaints, the lack of resources to deal with these seemingly dif-
fuse complaints, and the individualized nature of tenant-landlord 
relationships all play important roles in consumer bureaus’ prac-
tices towards tenant-consumers.
III. THE NEED FOR INCREASED CONSUMER AGENCY ENFORCEMENT 
OF TENANTS’ RIGHTS
There are several reasons why public enforcement of tenants’
rights is necessary. First, as will be discussed in Section III.A, on a 
fundamental level, renters should receive the full attention of con-
sumer protection agencies because renters are consumers. Similar-
ly, just as Warren and Bar-Gill noted the inconsistencies in the fact 
that agencies regulated tangible goods more than financial prod-
ucts, it is inconsistent for agencies to focus little on the rental in-
dustry when they devote significant resources to analogous indus-
tries. Section III.B thus argues that enforcement agencies should 
afford consumers of rental housing parity with other consumers. 
Section III.C argues that, for a variety of reasons, private enforce-
ment cannot adequately regulate the rental industry, and Section
III.D notes that public enforcement and private enforcement serve 
distinct goals. Finally, as discussed in Section III.E, achieving a fair 
and stable rental market is integral to advancing essential govern-
ment goals.
A. Consumer Protection Agencies Should Protect Renters Because 
Renters Are ‘Consumers’
In his 1980 article “The Tenant As a Consumer?,” James Back-
man stresses several key similarities between tenants and the arche-
255. Id.
256. Michigan Interview, supra note 247.
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typal consumer.257 For example, “[c]onsumer transactions are de-
fined typically as those for ‘personal family or household purpos-
es,’ ” and residential tenants are those who occupy “a structure that 
is used as a home, residence or sleeping place.”258 Both traditional 
consumers and residential tenants are “characterized in contrast to 
their counterparts in . . . business.”259 Modern tenant-landlord 
transactions, like other consumer transactions, are transactional in 
nature.260 Further, tenants and traditional consumers both suffer 
from a lack of bargaining power and “are typically subject to stand-
ard form contracts . . . .” Similarly, both tenants and traditional 
consumers suffer the brunt end of the knowledge asymmetry be-
tween themselves and the landlord or supplier.261 As the landlord 
engages in the transaction to turn a profit, the landlord is likely to 
exploit these asymmetries to the tenant-consumer’s detriment.262
Other scholars make a similar argument as a more semantic 
point.263 If consumers are purchasers of goods or services, the ar-
gument goes, then tenants are “consumers” because tenants pur-
chase housing goods and services.264
Others have analogized tenants to other consumers by discuss-
ing the principles underlying products liability. As stated by Joan L. 
Neisser in her article “The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict 
Liability Principles to Landlords:”
The public policy supporting strict liability in the landlord 
context is compelling . . . . A tenant in an apartment build-
ing does not have the control over the common areas or 
the resources and expertise to assure that such areas are 
reasonably safe. Nor is the tenant in the position to check 
that the wiring and heating facilities in the building are 
safe. The modern tenant must rely on her landlord to carry 
out these responsibilities. . . . An assessment of the realities 
of the landlord-tenant relationship also indicates that the 
257. Backman, supra note 33, at 3.
258. Id.
259. Backman, supra note 33, at 3; see also Thomas Bothwell, Washington Tenant Remedies 
and the Consumer Protection Act, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 559, 559–76 (1975) (arguing tenants should 
fall within Washington’s UDAP statute).
260. See Backman, supra note 33, at 1.
261. Id. at 3.
262. Id. at 4.
263. See, e.g., Claude W. Vanderwold, The Tenant as a Consumer, 3 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59
(1971).
264. Id. at 62–63 (“A social and legal trend has begun to protect the consumer of goods. 
The tenant is a consumer of housing, i.e., space and services. Since the tenant is a consumer 
in his own right and has disabilities similar to those of the consumer of goods, he should be 
included within the consumer protection trend and receive the benefits which that trend 
has to offer.”)
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landlord, as owner of the enterprise, is in the best position
to absorb the costs of maintaining the property. The land-
lord can obtain insurance to protect herself from the im-
pact of liability, and she can raise rent to defray any added 
costs encountered in keeping the premises reasonably 
safe.265
Much of the literature on the topic, while still compelling and 
relevant, came in the more immediate wake of the 1970s Tenant 
Revolution. The rental industry has obviously changed a great deal 
since then, so an updated look is necessary. 266
Indeed, especially in recent years, the rental market has been 
“commoditized.”267 Advertising and transacting within the residen-
tial rental market looks like advertising and transacting within any 
other consumer market. Searching for rental housing resembles 
any other type of online shopping.
Prospective renters today, for example, tend to find rental hous-
ing through online aggregation platforms that use analytics to tai-
lor their advertising to each specific consumer.268 Advertisements 
for rental housing advertise the amenities and services that accom-
pany the unit.269 Aggregation platforms not only include consumer-
oriented housing displays but also discount sales and targeted ad-
vertisements for third-party provided housing amenities, such as 
265. Neisser, supra note 16, at 549–50. Neisser also implicitly makes one of the argu-
ments against treating tenants as consumers—that consumer protection regimes generally 
cause costs to be passed on to consumers.
266. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau, Is That Rental Listing Real? A BBB Study of Rental 
Scams Involving Apartments, Houses and Vacation Properties, BETTER BUS. BUREAU (Dec. 10, 
2019), https://www.bbb.org/article/news-releases/21033-bbb-investigation-rental-scams
[https://perma.cc/D2JD-JNRC] (noting “millions of scams” regarding false apartment list-
ings and the like). Tenant abuses go well beyond these basic “scams,” but their existence 
highlights how the rental market resembles any other market regulators routinely police. Id.
267. Omri Barzilay, Technology Is Finally Changing the Apartment Rental Experience,
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/04/technology-is-finally-
changing-the-apartment-rental-experience [https://perma.cc/9GAQ-TDM9].
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., 1960 Lindsay Ln, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/homedetails/1960-
Lindsay-Ln-Ann-Arbor-MI-48104/54793391_zpid/ [https://perma.cc/R3PB-SVBB] (noting 
that amenities such as washer/dryer come with unit); 212 N 5th Ave,
BACKERSTREETPROPERTIES, http://bakerstreetproperties.rentlinx.com/212-N-5Th-Ave-Ann-
Arbor-MI-48104 [https://web.archive.org/web/20200201223927/http://bakerstreet
properties.rentlinx.com/212-N-5Th-Ave-Ann-Arbor-MI-48104]. This, however, does not nec-
essarily provide a contrast to rental advertising pre-internet. See, e.g., Dan Reed, This 1958 Ad 
Shows How Yesterday’s Luxury Apartments Became Today’s Affordable Apartments, GREATER GREAT 
WASH. (July 25, 2018), https://ggwash.org/view/64165/this-1958-ad-shows-how-yesterdays-
luxury-apartments-became-todays-affordabl [https://perma.cc/3Q7Q-B9J2]. But advertise-
ments for rental housing today are likely far more ubiquitous.
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internet services.270 An advertisement for one home inevitably dis-
plays links to advertisements for similar homes.271 Aggregation plat-
forms also allow for one-stop shopping of housing and furniture 
rental.272
In some instances, it can be hard to disentangle the aggregation 
website from the actual landlord. Aggregation sites like Rezi not 
only waive application fees when tenants apply through the site 
with participating landlords but also enable tenants to pay their 
rent online through the Rezi site itself.273 Bungalow not only ag-
gregates listings, but also adopts and paraphrases the lessors’ rep-
resentations about these listings: “Move-in ready homes[.] Our 
homes are designed to be move-in ready. Think furnished com-
mon areas, super fast wifi, and flexible leases.”274 Further, at least in 
some instances, Bungalow handles ongoing maintenance requests 
and the like: “House stuff, handled [.] We coordinate professional 
cleanings, call the utility providers for you, and collect rent from 
your roommates each month.”275
Even Craigslist, which was once perhaps analogous to the classi-
fied section of a newspaper, is filled with rental company ads which 
offer the sorts of deals and specials one would associate with any 
other consumer product.276 The aesthetic of rental company web-
sites is often not very different from that of aggregation sites—the 
difference is that rental companies are only aggregating their own 
properties.277
As illustrated above, this consumerist approach extends beyond 
the point of sale.278 Rental companies, for example, use their web-
sites to simultaneously solicit maintenance requests and advertise 
270. See, e.g., Medical Center Court Apartments, TRULIA, https://www.trulia.com
/c/mi/ann-arbor/medical-center-court-1005-maiden-ln-ann-arbor-mi-48105—2050038819
[https://perma.cc/QF33-99F4] (“Get up to a MONTH FREE on select apartments!”).
271. See, e.g., 8401 Rockmoor Ridge Road Charlotte, NC 28215, AM. HOMES 4 RENT,
https://www.americanhomes4rent.com/Property/8401-Rockmoor-Ridge-Road-Charlotte-
NC-28215/8ef29910-2a74-e511-80da-3863bb358df8 [https://perma.cc/GJ9G-75RC].
272. See, e.g., Furniture Rental, CORT, https://www.cort.com/furniture-rental
[https://perma.cc/3949-3MTN].
273. See, e.g., REZI, https://www.rentrezi.com/#!/tenant (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
274. BUNGALOW, https://bungalow.com/ [https://perma.cc/C4JT-Y9KN].
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., $1,025 / 2br – Dearborn Heights – 2 Br Move in Special *Free 50* Tv at Lease 
Signing, CRAIGSLIST, https://detroit.craigslist.org/wyn/apa/d/dearborn-heights-dearborn-
heights-br/7261822011.html [https://perma.cc/GR43-D3TU].
277. See, e.g., MICH. RENTAL, http://michiganrental.rentlinx.com/listings/
type:Apartments [https://perma.cc/3NQ7-7CWT]. Michigan Rental is a relatively small 
landlord, with its properties mostly concentrated in Ann Arbor, Michigan, but tellingly, its 
aesthetic is very similar to that of rental aggregation cites.
278. See, e.g., Property Management, REINHART REALTORS, https://www.reinhart
realtors.com/property-management/ [https://perma.cc/7BNP-WGC8].
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other products.279 The maintenance request screen itself likely fea-
tures links to other company products.280 Some rental companies 
advertise special repair services and/or other services available for 
an additional cost.281 Most fundamentally, rental ads promote the 
quality of the apartment and the inclusion of (at least impliedly) 
well-functioning amenities.
Residential rental marketing, thus, at the very least, fits squarely 
within a consumerist aesthetic; the tenant-landlord relationship in-
volves the same types of advertising, specials, upsells, third-party 
contracting, boilerplate terms of use, and the like that leave con-
sumers susceptible to abuses within any other market.
Further, the ongoing nature of the tenant-landlord relationship
blurs the distinction between “scams” that take place at the point 
of sale and other less traditional consumer abuses. For example, if 
the landlord fails to make repairs of advertised amenities, does that 
render these advertisements “false” in a traditional sense? This 
question need not be answered. Rather, it simply illustrates that 
abuses faced by tenants are analogous to abuses faced by other 
consumers. Treating rental markets as unique from other markets 
is anachronistic at best.
Still, simply making an analogy between tenants and consumers 
generally does not entirely address why consumer enforcement 
agencies should fully incorporate tenants into their mandates, a 
matter addressed in the following Sections.
B.  Consumer Enforcement Agencies Already Focus on Industries 
Particularly Analogous to the Rental Industry
The argument that consumer enforcement agencies should pro-
tect tenants is that much stronger considering these agencies al-
ready protect other similarly situated consumers.282 Two particular-
279. See, e.g., J. KELLER PROPS., https://www.jkellerproperties.com/ [https://perma.cc
/C9CP-V3LK].
280. See, e.g., Maintenance Service Requests, INVITATION HOMES, https://www.invitation
homes.com/maintenance-service-requests/ [https://perma.cc/L4S6-MDRH]; Maintenance 
Requests, J. KELLER PROPS., https://www.jkellerproperties.com/maintenance-requests-2/
[https://perma.cc/HED5-M24Z].
281. See, e.g., ProCare and Maintenance Requests – Resident Resources, INVITATION HOMES,
https://www.invitationhomes.com/procare/ [https://perma.cc/EU83-F3ZP].
282. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55, at 3–4.  Such an argument again somewhat paral-
lels that employed by Warren and Bar-Gill in arguing for an enforcement agency dedicated 
to protecting consumers of financial products. While enforcement agencies had not histori-
cally entirely ignored financial product markets, Warren and Bar-Gil argued that consumers 
of tangible products were the primary focus of government enforcement, making consum-
ers of financial products an afterthought. However, if financial consumers are analogous in 
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ly analogous industries come to mind: the home improvement in-
dustry and the mortgage and mortgage servicing industry.283
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that large numbers of con-
sumers already complain to consumer protection agencies about 
tenant-landlord issues.284 Thus, tenants have a manifest desire to be 
assisted by consumer protection agencies, even while other poten-
tial sources of help exist.285
As has been discussed, it is already well-settled practice for con-
sumer protection bureaus to focus their resources on regulating 
the home repair and mortgage lending industries. Employing simi-
lar logic, enforcement bureaus should consider the protection of 
tenants as central to their mandates.
1.  Home Repair
Existing data indicates that state consumer protection bureaus 
likely file more enforcement claims against the construction and 
home repair industry than any other industry.286 Consumer com-
plaints about home repair contractors are often at or near the top 
of consumer protection bureaus’ annual consumer complaints 
lists.287
It is easy to analogize home repair transactions and rental trans-
actions for consumer enforcement purposes. Even if renting a 
home is, itself, merely a transfer of property interest, the rental 
transaction necessarily implies that the landlord will also provide 
ongoing repair services. Landlords advertise the quality of their 
apartments and their own quality as landlords. Tenants rent prop-
erty with the expectation that their landlord will make repairs, and
lease agreements often reflect this expectation. Even if they do not, 
the warranty of habitability is read into leases by law.288
essential ways to consumers already receiving the attention of enforcement agencies, it 
stands to reason that financial consumers should as well.
283. Other potentially analogous industries are the timeshare and storage rental indus-
tries. The similarities between timeshare consumers and tenants are obvious, especially as 
the only difference between timeshare consumers and traditional tenants is the option to 
buy at the end of the lease. Similarly, tenants face many of the same problems as consumers 
of storage space, yet storage consumers likely receive more attention from consumer agen-
cies. However, there is less data available to gauge the extent to which agencies pursue rent-
to-buy, timeshare, and storage companies so a comparison is more difficult.
284. For each of the last ten years, complaints about tenant-landlord issues have been 
within the top ten categories of consumer complaints to state consumer enforcement bu-
reaus nationwide. See supra note 251.
285. See id. (demonstrating that tenants often make complaints to consumer protection 
agencies).
286. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 66 tbl.4.
287. See id.
288. Super, supra note 28, at 393.
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As such, even if renting involves a property transaction, the ten-
ant is clearly exchanging money for the landlord’s services.289 In-
deed, tenants literally contract with landlords to provide repair ser-
vices for the rented property. Thus, as consumer agencies often 
pursue enforcement actions against shoddy repair companies, so 
too should they pursue landlord and property management com-
panies that fail to properly make repairs or maintain the property.
2.  Mortgage and Mortgage Servicing
Examining consumer enforcement activity in the wake of the 
foreclosure crisis helps illustrate why such agencies should take 
more action to protect tenants. The formation of the CFPB solidi-
fied the notion that purchasers of credit, especially mortgages, are 
consumers in need of protection from consumer enforcement 
agencies. Indeed, the CFPB was formed largely in response to the 
foreclosure crisis.290 Further, in the wake of the Crisis, both private 
and public UDAP litigation targeting mortgage servicers greatly 
proliferated.291 Nearly every state entered into consent judgments 
with mortgage banks as part of the National Mortgage Settlements, 
regardless of whether these states’ UDAP laws apply to the mort-
gage industry.292
Yet, regulation of the rental market is more important than reg-
ulation of the mortgage industry. Leases are shorter term than 
mortgages, making renters far more vulnerable to displacement. 
Property management companies and landlords play a central role 
in the day-to-day wellbeing of their tenants, as they are obligated to 
make repairs and ensure habitability. Mortgage servicers, on the 
other hand, only habitually interact with homeowners in default. 
289. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977). In Woods, for example, plaintiffs 
brought a claim under UDAP, alleging that defendant seller sold them a home and prom-
ised to make any needed repairs, but then failed to make repairs that arose. Id. at 664. The 
Texas Supreme court addressed the question of whether plaintiffs were “consumers,” i.e.,
purchasers of good and services, under the UDAP statute. Id. at 666. While the Texas statute 
explicitly includes real estate transactions, the court concluded that, even if real estate 
transactions are excluded, plaintiffs were still consumers, “[s]ince the builders . . . promised 
to repair any defects in the home that arose within the first year, Woods not only purchased 
the real property but also, and in addition, the services of the builders . . . .” Woods, 54 
S.W.2d at 666–67; see also Fernandez v. Mark Dev., Inc., 262 P.3d 670 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
290. See Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why We Need a Consumer 
Watchdog, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:13 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why-we-need-
consumer-watchdog [https://perma.cc/3CLT-YUQ3]; Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate,
DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/
[https://perma.cc/F3AN-ED5B].
291. See Cox et al., supra note 29, at 38–39.
292. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 38–39; see also NMS, supra note 122.
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Even during times of crisis, this constitutes only a relatively small 
minority of homeowners.293 Otherwise, the main job of mortgage 
services is simply to process payments and send periodic letters to 
borrowers.294 There is, thus, likely potential for more consumer 
abuse in the rental context.
Notably, the foreclosure process, like the eviction process, is 
governed by a distinct statutory scheme in most states,295 yet con-
sumer fraud agencies still regulate mortgage lenders, as opposed 
to treating the foreclosure process as displacing UDAP enforce-
ment.296 Again, agency protection of tenants is all the more neces-
sary, as the foreclosure process generally provides more protection 
than the eviction process, even in states with non-judicial foreclo-
sure processes.297 As such, it is inconsistent for consumer agencies 
to give lower priority to tenants than homeowners.
Further, while there are of course differences between the 
mortgage lending industry and rental industry, they are similar in 
several relevant ways. Both borrower-lender and tenant-landlord 
transactions involve an ongoing relationship where one party is 
generally motivated by profit and the other by the desire to estab-
lish a stable living situation. The borrower/tenant makes monthly 
payments to the lender/landlord each month, but if the borrow-
er/tenant defaults, then the lender/landlord may retake the 
home. In many instances, the lender/landlord will report the de-
fault to credit reporting agencies or tenant screening agencies 
such that the borrower/tenant will have trouble securing high 
quality housing in the future. These transactions are thus similarly 
high stakes to the consumer—the consumer may lose their home if 
they fail to pay.
A possible distinction is that a mortgage involves the selling of a 
financial product while a lease involves only the transfer of a real 
293. Mortgage Delinquency Rates in the United States from 2000 to 4th Quarter 2020, STATISTA
(Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/205959/us-mortage-delinquency-rates-
since-1990 (noting that peak rates of delinquency were at 9.3% during the 2007-2010 hous-
ing crisis).
294. Mortgage Lenders and Mortgage Servicers, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/whats-difference-between-mortgage-
lender-and-mortgage-servicer.asp [https://perma.cc/M5QN-6FFY].
295. Amy Loftsgordon, Key Aspects of State Foreclosure Law: 50-State Chart, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/50-state-chart-key-aspects-state-foreclosure-
law.html [https://perma.cc/32EQ-C4MQ].
296. Compare id., with U.S. Foreclosure Laws by State, REALTYTRAC,
https://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-guides/foreclosure-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9SGX-
NXQQ].
297. Compare U.S. Foreclosure Laws by State, supra note 296, with Devon Thorsby, Does Your 
State Have Fair Eviction Laws?, US NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 1, 2018, 1:03 PM), 
https://realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/slideshows/does-your-state-have-fair-eviction-laws
(state foreclosure processes generally far more lengthy and requiring more stages than state 
eviction processes).
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property interest. But such a distinction illustrates its own banality. 
The consequences to the borrower/tenant of failing to make the 
contractually required payments are closely analogous. Further, 
the fact that homeowners, unlike tenants, build equity with each 
payment is certainly not a reason to protect tenants less.
Another potentially relevant distinction between tenants and 
homeowners is that protecting borrowers is more feasible because 
the mortgage-lending market is more concentrated than the rental 
market. As will be discussed below, however, the rental industry has 
become increasingly concentrated. In fact, that the use of rental-
backed securities is still emergent provides all the more reason for 
increased regulation of this industry as it is being formed.298
Further, that the rental industry may be more diffuse does not 
meaningfully distinguish it from the mortgage industry for agency 
enforcement purposes. In fact, data suggests that state consumer 
protection bureaus are more likely to bring an enforcement case 
against a business with less than three employees than one with 
more than 400; even more commonly, these bureaus file actions 
against individuals as opposed to business entities.299 For example, 
state consumer bureaus bring a large percentage of suits against 
the home repair industry, which itself explains why suits against 
small businesses and individuals are so common.300 These distinc-
tions do not provide a meaningful difference that justifies protect-
ing homeowners, but not renters, as consumers.
C. Private Enforcement Is Insufficient
The Tenant Revolution of the 1970s was an essential step for-
ward for tenants but, in contrast to other consumer classes, en-
forcement agencies still do not prioritize tenant protection, leaving 
tenants to enforce their own rights.301 Such a system is largely inef-
fective.302 Regardless of the reason private enforcement of tenants’
298. See Alana Semuels, When Wall Street Is Your Landlord, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-family-landlords-wall-
street/582394 [https://perma.cc/647G-F3NF].
299. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 61–62.
300. See Cox et al., supra note 29, at 66; ABBE WILL, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES,
ACHIEVING SCALE IN THE RESIDENTIAL REMODELING INDUSTRY: FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
WITH INDUSTRY LEADERS, at iii (2014), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default
/files/w14-2_will.pdf [https://perma.cc/762E-G96M] (“[T]he industry continues to be 
highly fragmented, with the vast majority of remodeling companies operating as relatively 
small, single-location businesses.”).
301. See Super, supra note 28, at 459.
302. Id. at 398 (stating warranty of habitability has not proven effective); Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Eliminating Landlord Retaliation in England and Wales – Lessons from the United 
States, 75 LA. L. REV. 1071, 1108–17 (2015) (finding anti-retaliation laws have not proven 
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rights does not work, it is fairly clear that it does not.303 Indeed, 
“the results achieved by” the pro-tenant reforms of the 1970s “have 
been far from what their advocates predicted.”304
As discussed, the most important innovations of the Tenant 
Revolution were the warranty of habitability and anti-retaliation 
laws.305 Both have proven ineffective. As observed by one scholar:
“[B]oth statistical and anecdotal reports suggest that tenants lose 
nearly all eviction cases, whether or not landlord retaliation is in-
volved. In fact, reports that tenants ‘always’ lose eviction cases, or 
lose in 95% to 99% of cases, are not unusual.”306 Similarly, a study 
of 2014 eviction cases in Essex County, New Jersey found that ten-
ants asserted the habitability defense in only 0.2% of cases.307 Inter-
estingly, commentators have gone to great lengths to diagnose the 
shortcomings of a private enforcement-based tenants’ rights re-
gime, but often the proposed solutions, such as providing tenants 
free attorneys or reforming the summary eviction process, still 
leave tenants almost entirely reliant on private enforcement.308
effective in the United States); Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Sum-
mary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 194–203 (2000) (citing summary 
eviction procedures and other factors as reasons the Tenant Revolution did not produce the 
desired results); Furth-Matzkin, supra note 15, at 8 (documenting the prevalence of illegal 
lease clauses).
303. Super, supra note 28, at 394.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 394; see also Lonegrass, supra note 302, at 1106.
306. Lonegrass, supra note 302, at 1107 (“Additionally, reported decisions in which ten-
ants prevail on retaliatory eviction claims are few and far between . . . .”).
307. Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin & David J. Guznik, The Implied Warranty of Habitabil-
ity Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016). 
Importantly, the study finds the warranty of habitability to be effective in remedying code 
violations in the few instances that it is raised. However, the article is largely dedicated to
explaining barriers to the defense being raised.
308. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 17, at 510–17 (arguing for additional compulsory lease 
terms); see generally Franzese et al., supra note 307 (arguing for removing impediments to 
tenants’ ability to assert defenses to eviction); Denise J. Deschenes, Consumer Protection Legis-
lation and the Assertion of Tenant Rights: The Massachusetts Paradigm, 59 B.U. L. REV. 483, 503–
05 (1979) (advocating tenant use of UDAP laws in private lawsuits); Spector, supra note 302 
(advocating for reforms to summary eviction process); Lurie, supra note 106 (advocating for 
private fair housing litigation); Lonegrass, supra note 302 (advocating reforms to better en-
able tenants to raise retaliation); Grellmann, supra note 106, at 317 (noting that the Protec-
tive Tenants at Foreclosure Act is best enforced by tenants in state courts as opposed to by a 
government agency). The main exception seems to be where commentators propose that 
steps be taken to better enable HUD to regulate landlords receiving housing subsidies, 
though some commentators also argue in fairly general terms that more government en-
forcement of tenants’ rights is necessary. See, e.g., Sabbeth, supra note 208 (offering a public-
private enforcement hybrid solution); Franzese et al., supra note 307, at 42–43 (advocating, 
in part, for a court database to bolster HUD enforcement, though this argument ignores 
that only a very small percentage of poor tenants receive HUD benefits); see also Super, supra
note 28, at 461 (advocating, primarily, that expanded housing subsidies is key to protecting 
tenants).
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Providing tenants with counsel and bolstering available defenses 
will help tenants as a whole.309 For example, New York’s recent ten-
ant reforms have made a tremendous difference.310 But, at least un-
til rent control and free counsel are enacted on a broad scale, pub-
lic enforcement is essential to filling private enforcement gaps.311
Not surprisingly, the deck is largely stacked against tenants. The 
advances of the Tenant Revolution were designed to allow tenants 
to play defense. As stated by David Super, “The essence of the ten-
ants’ rights revolution was . . . straightforward . . . . Tenants could 
raise the landlord’s failure to comply with [the implied warranties 
of habitability and repair] as a defense in an eviction proceeding 
for nonpayment of rent.”312 Tenants facing such abuses are ex-
pected to invite court proceedings by deliberately withholding 
rent.313 Doing so, however, is an extremely risky proposition, as it 
merely places at-risk tenants in a summary court proceeding al-
ready weighed heavily against them.314 Further, once in court, ten-
ants must often escrow rent to pursue their defenses, such that the 
tenant must effectively pay rent before arguing in court that rent 
should be abated.315 This requirement is often cost-prohibitive for 
tenants, especially if the tenants’ rental money was spent on alter-
native shelter or needed repairs.316
Further, the “summary” nature of eviction proceedings cannot 
be overstated.317 One study found that the average eviction hearing 
309. Mara Gay, Opinion, Evictions Are Down in New York. Thank the Voters., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26/opinion/new-york-evictions.html
[https://perma.cc/PX3E-FCLD] (detailing the efficacy of rent control laws and providing 
tenants facing eviction with counsel).
310. See Gay, supra note 309; see also Josh Barbanel, New York Evictions Are Plunging Under 
New Rent Control Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-
evictions-are-plunging-under-new-rent-control-law-11574793114 [https://perma.cc/TYK7-
QHHZ].
311. See Waterstone, supra note 29.
312. Super, supra note 28, at 394.
313. Id. at 407–08.
314. Id.
315. Franzese et al., supra note 307, at 13–14.
316. See id.
317. As stated by one scholar:
A summary proceeding for eviction exists in every state . . . . [T]his procedure fails 
to accommodate what scholars have called a “revolution” in the law of landlords 
and residential tenants that significantly expanded tenants’ rights by the adoption 
of such doctrines as the warranties of habitability and retaliatory evictions. In-
stead . . . continued use of the summary proceeding . . . undermines many of the 
benefits the revolution hoped to accomplish.
Spector, supra note 302, at 137.
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lasts for one minute and 44 seconds.318 Such procedures include 
little formal discovery.319
Even more importantly, the most vulnerable tenants can rarely 
afford counsel320 and thus must navigate a chaotic court process on 
their own.321 Landlords, on the other hand, almost inevitably have 
attorneys who tend to run the show in eviction court.322 Providing 
free counsel to tenants facing eviction is an essential step and 
makes a tremendous difference for tenants.323 Still, these counsels
are forced to represent tenants within the confines of existing evic-
tion procedures.324
Similarly, to obtain free counsel, tenants must come to court. 
Defaults amongst tenants are high.325 Eviction notices are often 
confusing and come with very quickly approaching court dates, 
sometimes in as little as three days.326 Such hearings are inevitably 
scheduled during the workday or in the morning when parents are 
shuffling their kids off to school.
318. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S 
EVICTION COURT 7 (2003), https://lcbh.org/sites/default/files/resources/2003-lcbh-
chicago-eviction-court-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKM2-5AS3]; Curtis Black,  Chicago 
Should Implement Right to Counsel in Eviction Court Like New York and San Francisco, CHI. REP.
(Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-should-implement-right-to-
counsel-in-eviction-court-like-new-york-and-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/TZ4H-K73P].
319. Working: How Does a Tenants’ Rights Attorney Do His Job?, SLATE (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://slate.com/podcasts/working/2019/11/how-does-a-tenants-rights-attorney-do-his-job
[https://perma.cc/GX2Z-CUSG]. Some states court rules explicitly disallow discovery in 
eviction cases. See, e.g., N.J. COURT RULE 6:4-3. Ironically, tenant defenses against landlords 
often require extensive discovery and even expert testimony. Tenants raising a habitability 
defense, for example, must present extensive evidence of the condition of the home and 
their attempts to notify the landlord of the condition. To prove the presence of lead paint 
and its health effects, tenants will likely need expert testimony or at least that of a home in-
spector or doctor. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Lepage, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and the Problem of
Causation: Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 155, 158 (1995).
320. Franzese et al., supra note 307, at 12–13.
321. Super, supra note 28, at 406–07.
322. See Gay, supra note 309 (detailing how pro se plaintiffs must go up against repre-
sented landlords in New York); Heidi Schultheis & Caitlin Rooney, A Right to Counsel Is a 
Right to a Fighting Chance, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2019/10/02/475263/right-counsel-right-fighting-
chance [https://perma.cc/7UHR-P5C4] (“When it comes to evictions, tenants are set up to 
fail. In eviction lawsuits nationwide, an estimated 90 percent of landlords have legal repre-
sentation, while only 10 percent of tenants do.”).
323. Schultheis & Rooney, supra note 322.
324. Munira Alimire, Examining the Tenant Right to Counsel Rollout Landscape, MEDIUM
(July 15, 2019), https://medium.com/legal-design-and-innovation/examining-the-tenant-
right-to-counsel-rollout-landscape-567f70f70899 [https://perma.cc/JN58-KLPS].
325. See Badger & Bui, supra note 7 (“‘The whole system works on default judgments and 
people not showing up,’ said Martin Wegbreit, director of litigation at the Central Virginia 
Legal Aid Society. ‘Imagine if every person asked for a trial. The system would bog down in a 
couple of months.’ ”).
326. Move Out in Three Days? Are They Serious? The Meaning of Eviction Notices, IOWA LEGAL 
AID (June 11, 2018), https://www.iowalegalaid.org/resource/move-out-in-three-days-are-
they-serious-the-m [https://perma.cc/PXD9-TAPA].
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These high rates of default are, indeed, no coincidence. The 
eviction process is designed to be carried out in the absence of 
tenant-defendants, as evictions generally take place during over-
crowded court “cattle calls,” which likely could not function if all 
the tenants show up.327 Further, landlords often mislead tenants 
about their right to appear, or the usefulness of appearing.328
Fear of retaliation also significantly hamstrings tenants’ ability to 
enforce their own rights in court, even in a defensive posture, thus 
contributing to high rates of default. 329 The most rational course 
of action may be for tenants to simply leave and find new housing, 
even if there are viable defenses or counterclaims to the eviction.330
Providing tenants with an additional disincentive to litigate, if ten-
ants leave before an eviction judgment is entered, they avoid a
damning mark on their credit report.331 Even if no judgment is en-
tered, prospective landlords may catch wind that tenant-applicants 
are in litigation with their current landlord, dimming tenants’
chances of finding new quality housing.332
Undermining the entire current protection scheme, private en-
forcement of state anti-retaliation laws has also proven largely inef-
fective, again due to the fact that most tenants are not represented 
in a court process already stacked against them. Further, retaliatory 
motive is empirically difficult to prove. And, ironically, the threat 
of retaliation may deter some tenants from alleging retaliation. As 
with other consumers, statutory protections should be coupled 
327. See Badger & Bui, supra note 7.
328. See generally, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 15 (noting the prominence of illegal 
lease clauses and their misleading effects on tenants).
329. See Spector, supra note 302, at 137; Lonegrass, supra note 302.
330. Super, supra note 28, at 408.
331. See D.C. BAR PRO BONO CTR., Judgments, Writs, and Stopping Evictions - Information 
for Tenants, LAWHELP.ORG, https://www.lawhelp.org/dc/resource/judgments-writs-and-
stopping-evictions-inform [https://perma.cc/3EKH-XYMZ].
332. See Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect 
Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1353 (2007). It is also very difficult for tenants to get nega-
tive rental history marks removed from the credit reports used by future landlords. Most 
creditors, like mortgage lenders, credit card companies and car financers, rely on the “big 
three” credit reporting agencies—Trans Union, Equifax, and Experian. Therefore, consum-
ers are entitled to a free annual copy of the credit reports creditors rely on and can com-
plain to credit reporting entities under the Fair Credit Reporting Act accordingly. The ten-
ant screening industry, which is a subset of the consumer reporting industry, is less 
oligopolistic, which, ironically, hurts consumers because it is much harder to determine 
what entity to complain to in the instance of a potential inaccuracy. See Kleysteuber, supra, at 
1356; Paul Schack, Tenant Screening Agencies and Reports, MASS. L. HELP (May 2017), 
https://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing/lt1-chapter-2-agencies-reports [https://perma.cc
/49K7-CK2Q]; see also TEX PASLEY, HENRY OSTRO-SHAH & ERIC SIROTA, SHRIVER CTR. ON 
POVERTY LAW, SCREENED OUT: HOW TENANT SCREENING REPORTS UNDERMINE FAIR HOUSING 
LAWS AND DEPRIVE TENANTS OF EQUAL ACCESS TO HOUSING IN ILLINOIS 3–8 (2021), 
https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/tenant-screening-final-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3ZT-EAXV].
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with the attention of consumer protection agencies, as private en-
forcement of these laws does not alone prove effective.
Public consumer enforcement, while far from panacean, avoids 
many of these pitfalls, often for obvious reason. Enforcement 
agencies have far deeper pockets and far more power than indi-
vidual tenants. Enforcement agencies control the pace of litigation 
as plaintiffs outside of the confines of the summary eviction pro-
cess. They do not fear retaliation.
Otherwise put, consumer agencies must police the rental market 
for the same reasons they do other markets—consumers are nei-
ther powerful nor coordinated enough to effectively police for 
themselves.333 Tenants, who are often low income and who must lit-
igate their claims in a summary court process with potential home-
lessness hanging over their head, are uniquely disadvantaged by 
these asymmetries. There is reason to believe that consumer fraud 
bureaus can effectively protect renters from abuses,334 just as they 
protect consumers in analogous industries.
D. Public Enforcement Serves a Distinct Purpose from Private Enforcement
But, more than that, consumer agency enforcement efforts play 
a distinct and complementary role to private enforcement.335 Ten-
333. See Waterstone, supra note 29, at 461–63 (arguing that public enforcement can
overcome financial disincentives to private litigation and that “most of the limitations that 
apply to private attorneys general do not apply to public enforcement authorities”). The 
article notes that public enforcement has become necessary as a substitute for private class 
action litigation as courts curtail the availability of class action litigation.
334. See, e.g., Final Consent Judgment, Illinois v. Safeguard Props., LLC, No. 13CH20715 
(June 3, 2015); see also Carrie Wells, Maryland Attorney General Settles with Safeguard Properties,
BALT. SUN (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-safeguard-
settlement-20150828-story.html; Waterstone, supra note 29, at 456 (noting examples of the 
efficacy of both public and private structural litigation); ETHAN LUTZ, MIKE LITT & ED
MIERZWINSKI, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, POSITIONED TO PROTECT: HOW STATE AND LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES CAN FILL THE CFPB VOID 28–29 (2018); Cox et al., supra note 29, at 49; Mark 
Totten, The Enforcers & The Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1638, 1644 (2015); 
Peterson, supra note 29, at 1104; Abigail M. Lyle & Nikki Skolnekovich, Client Alert: State At-
torneys General Continue to Fill the Enforcement Gap for Consumer, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH 
(Jan. 2019), https://www.huntonak.com/images/content/5/5/v2/55737/state-ags-fill-
enforcement-gap-consumer-protections.pdf [https://perma.cc/9265-6AXU] (demonstrat-
ing attorneys advising financial clients to comply with regulations and promptly address con-
sumer complaints to avoid UDAP enforcement actions); A Midyear Review of State Attorney 
General Enforcement, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: INSIGHTS (June 29, 2018),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/06/a-midyear-review-of-state-
attorney-general-enforce [https://perma.cc/7TCH-M2JH] (warning clients of costs associ-
ated with AG enforcement actions and illustrating how AG consumer divisions have empiri-
cally helped shaped large scale policy).
335. LUTZ ET AL., supra note 334, at 28–29; Cox et al., supra note 29, at 49; see also Totten 
supra note 334; Peterson, supra note 29, at 1104; Lyle & Skolnekovich, supra note 334; FOLEY 
& LARDNER LLP, supra note 334. See generally Pridgen, supra note 33 (emphasizing the com-
plimentary roles played by public and private enforcement).
SPRING 2021] Protecting Tenants 721
ant litigants, and their attorneys, are focused on achieving the ten-
ant’s immediate needs, be it allowing the tenant to stay in the 
home for the long or short term or designing a move-out plan that 
least damages the tenant’s credit. Of course, in the aggregate, 
these private efforts can lead to systemic change.336 But public en-
forcement actions can focus more deliberately on the systemic 
regulation of an industry.337 Public enforcement agencies, likewise, 
can act as aggregators of tenant grievances.338 Further, public en-
forcement efforts are, by design, more specifically targeted and 
higher profile than private litigation. This enhances the general 
deterrent value of consumer enforcement actions, especially where 
such actions are brought under UDAP laws that generally allow for 
far more powerful remedies than the largely reactive protections of 
tenant-landlord law.339
As with other industries, private and public enforcement of ten-
ants’ rights complement each other. The Foreclosure Crisis 
sparked the emergence of mandatory foreclosure mediation pro-
grams and increased funding to provide individual representation 
to homeowners,340 but also the establishment of the CFPB and ac-
tivism from state attorneys general. There is already a great deal of 
literature arguing that enforcement is most effective when robust 
efforts are made both by private litigants and enforcement agen-
cies.341 Relatedly, high profile enforcement actions may help bring 
more attention to tenants and bolster their private enforcement.342
Tenants need such protection at least as much as other consumers.
The need for increased public enforcement becomes that much 
greater as the rental industry becomes increasingly nationalized.343
Indeed, corporations are increasingly dominating the rental mar-
ket. An entity with significant consolidated resources, such as a 
government agency, is thus necessary to serve as a check upon this 
industry. As stated by Harvard’s 2018 report on The State of the 
Nation’s Housing, “[a]lthough conversions of single family homes 
336. See, e.g., Barbanel, supra note 310.
337. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 461 (“Apart from being allowed to play a structural 
role, public enforcement authorities are uniquely suited to fill the structural enforcement 
gap.”).
338. Id. at 467 (noting that enforcement by public enforcement agencies is especially 
needed where individuals’ claims are likely too individuated for class action cases).
339. NCLC, supra note 27, § 13.1.
340. See, e.g., Melanca Clark & Daniel Olmos, Emerging Strategies in Foreclosure Mediation,
NCSC (2011), https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/financial/id/170
[https://perma.cc/PX9P-MGRN].
341. See, e.g., Pridgen, supra note 33, at 946.
342. Cf. id. (noting that state attorney general consumer enforcement actions “can 
stretch the boundaries of consumer protection in ways that benefit consumers”).
343. JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 26–27; Semuels, supra note 298 (noting that institu-
tional investors are buying up large portions of rental stock).
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added significantly to the rental stock right after the housing crash, 
multifamily construction ramped up quickly to become the main 
source of additional supply.”344 In some urban areas, the domi-
nance of these larger rental companies is especially pronounced.345
In fact, more recently, there has even been somewhat of a flourish-
ing of rental-backed security investors and the like.346 Little data ex-
ists on whether tenants in these newer multifamily buildings are 
likely to face abuse. On the one hand, the new units tend to be 
fairly high end,347 indicating that abuse may be less likely as wealthy 
tenants are less likely to face abuse. On the other hand, large 
buildings are more likely to be owned by corporate investors, and 
there is some data suggesting that corporate landlords are more 
abusive than individual landlords, at least in some respects.348 Re-
gardless, relying so heavily on David to police Goliath is not sus-
tainable. Tenant-consumers need a champion of their own, as the 
government already provides for most other consumers subject to 
potential abuses from businesses big and small.
E. The Importance of Public Consumer Enforcement Actions in 
Furthering Other Government Interests
There is no dearth of literature on the negative externalities of 
housing instability. Housing stability is a keystone of public 
health.349 Similarly, “[T]he impact of poor housing conditions on 
educational achievement is well established.”350 Housing instability 
is also a significant criminogenic factor.351 Assisting tenants facing 
344. JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 26.
345. Id. at 26–27.
346. See Semuels, supra note 298.
347. See JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 26–27.
348. See Semuels, supra note 298 (quoting tenant stating “ ‘I said I’d never rent from a 
big company again’ ”); Hyojung Lee, Who Owns Rental Properties, and Is It Changing?, HARV.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD.: BLOG (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/
who-owns-rental-properties-and-is-it-changing [https://perma.cc/8YLG-RU92] (citing a 
study that found corporate landlords are more likely to pursue eviction than smaller land-
lords); Mandu Sen & Moses Gates, The High Cost of Bad Landlords: Impacts of Irresponsible 
Building Ownership in New York City, REG’L PLAN ASS’N (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://citylimits.org/2018/10/24/report-bad-landlords-are-few-in-number-but-destructive-
in-impact [https://perma.cc/5QSM-VQV3] (“But while bad landlords own only one in 50 
buildings, their buildings tend to be large.”).
349. DANNY FRIEDMAN, ECOTEC, SOCIAL IMPACT OF POOR HOUSING 12 (2010),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9406&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WCV-TN74].
350. Id. at 9.
351. See Corina Graif, Andrew S. Gladfelter & Stephen A. Matthews, Urban Poverty and 
Neighborhood Effects on Crime: Incorporating Spatial and Network Perspectives, 8 SOC. COMPASS 
1140, 1144 (2014); Marie Skubak Tillyer & Rebecca J. Walter, Low-Income Housing and Crime: 
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landlord abuses is thus essential to government goals of ensuring 
public health, providing students a quality education, and fighting 
crime.
What bears specific mention is that government enforcement 
agencies have already acknowledged this but are not fully commit-
ted to it in practice. Notably, for example, various enforcement 
agencies directly regulate the use of lead paint in rental housing 
for exactly these reasons.352 The presence of lead paint in rental 
housing has decreased over time. But other hardships faced by
tenants have similar, if less biologically determinative, impacts. The 
Rental Crisis is its own public health crisis.353
Perhaps framing the Rental Crisis in terms of its negative exter-
nalities will help highlight the need for public enforcement. Man-
aging public health epidemics, providing education, reducing 
crime, and addressing neighborhood blight are familiar roles of 
government. Even if protecting individual tenants does not fit 
neatly into the role of enforcement agencies, protecting society as 
a whole clearly does.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
Having argued that consumer enforcement agencies should bet-
ter incorporate tenant protection into their mandates and ex-
plored the current barriers to them doing so, this Part will propose 
specific reforms to help agencies overcome such barriers and more 
robustly use their enforcement powers to protect tenant-
consumers. These barriers, of course, vary by agency. And agencies 
in states whose UDAP statute does not apply to tenants obviously 
face additional barriers to using their enforcement authority to 
help tenants. As such, this section will propose separate reforms 
depending on whether courts read the underlying UDAP statute to 
protect tenants. Many of the reforms suggested for one camp, 
however, may help the other.
The Influence of Housing Development and Neighborhood Characteristics, 65 CRIME & DELINQ., 969,
969–93 (2018).
352. Press Release, Envt’l Prot. Agency, EPA Enforcement Actions Help Protect Vulner-
able Communities from Lead-Based Paint Health Hazards (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-enforcement-actions-help-protect-vulnerable-
communities-lead-based-paint-health-1 [https://perma.cc/LGR3-JFLD]; Press Release, 
Hous. & Urb. Dev., Secretary Carson Kicks-Off National Healthy Homes Month – Announc-
es Protect Our Kids! Campaign to Enforce Lead Safety Rules (June 1, 2018),
https://archives.hud.gov/news/2018/pr18-051.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZUV2-WCQ2].
353. Allison Bovell-Ammo & Megan Sandel, The Hidden Health Crisis of Eviction, B.U. SCH.
PUB. HEALTH (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bu.edu/sph/2018/10/05/the-hidden-health-
crisis-of-eviction [https://perma.cc/7N4Q-Q2TB].
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Before entering discussion, however, it is important to give cred-
it where it is due. The following Section will thus discuss the non-
law enforcement actions agencies take to protect tenants.
A.  Ways Consumer Enforcement Agencies Currently Help Tenants Beyond 
Law Enforcement
First, many agencies engage in educational and outreach efforts. 
Some publish354 or edit355 know-your-rights materials for renters and 
materials for landlords to help assure legal compliance. Agencies, 
similarly, hold in-person workshops for tenants and landlords.356
Importantly, there is not necessarily a correlation between the 
agencies that undergo these efforts and those whose UDAP statutes 
apply to tenants or who more commonly litigate these issues.357 In-
deed, bureaus hesitant to litigate on behalf of tenants may vigor-
ously take up other tenant protection efforts. Hawai’I, for example, 
whose UDAP statute does not cover tenants, operates a tenant hot-
line through its consumer protection agency.358
Further, consumer enforcement agencies may engage in lobby-
ing on behalf of tenants.359 For instance, while Iowa’s consumer 
fraud bureau may lack authority to litigate tenant matters related 
to violations of Iowa’s Landlord Tenant Act, the office has lobbied 
the state legislature to enhance tenant protections.360 When stu-
dents in Iowa City began arguing for security deposit reform, for 
354. See, e.g., Renter’s Rights, ATT’Y GEN. TEX., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/
consumer-protection/home-real-estate-and-travel/renters-rights [https://perma.cc/3UC7-
V56Z]; Landlord/Tenant Guide, WIS. DEP’T OF AG., TRADE & CONSUMER PROT.,
https://datcp.wi.gov/Pages/Publications/LandlordTenantGuide.aspx [https://perma.cc
/4GDF-RRTU].
355. See, e.g., Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
356. See, e.g., Vermont Interview, supra note 232.
357. For example, the Texas Attorney General’s Consumer Fraud Bureau creates re-
sources to educate tenants but has brought few consumer protection enforcement actions 
on behalf of tenants. See Renter’s Rights, supra note 354. Contra infra Appendix A.
358. HAW. DEP’T OF COM. & CONSUMER AFFS., HANDBOOK FOR THE HAWAII RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (2016), https://cca.hawaii.gov/hfic/files/2013/03/landlord-
tenant-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/M56F-BGDJ]. Towards the proposition that Ha-
wai’i’s UDAP does not cover landlord-tenant matters, see, for example, Cieri v. Leticia Que-
ry Realty, 80 Haw. 54, 59 (1995); Kim v. CB Richard Ellis Haw., Inc., 288 Fed. App’x 312, 314 
(9th Cir. 2008); and Souza v. Fisher, No. 1RC12-1-000925, 2017 WL 1293657, at *7 (Haw. Ct. 
App. Apr. 7, 2017).
359. See, e.g., Press Release Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen., AG Paxton Joins 25-State Bipar-
tisan Coalition Calling on Education Secretary to Preserve States’ Oversight of Student Loan 
Industry (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-
joins-25-state-bipartisan-coalition-calling-education-secretary-preserve-states-oversight
[https://perma.cc/E5GN-KVN8] (providing an example of attorneys general lobbying on 
behalf of consumers); see also Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attor-
neys General After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 172 (2013).
360. Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
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example, the consumer fraud bureau sent a representative to the 
state capital to engage in a prolonged lobbying effort.361 As stated 
by the office, “our lobbyists are over there [at the state legislature] 
just to . . . represent the consumer and make sure consumers have 
a voice.”362 Notably, Iowa’s office also lobbied to compensate for its 
own lack of enforcement power in the rental arena, successfully 
persuading the legislature to ensure tenants maintained robust 
private remedies against landlords.363
Consumer fraud bureaus also help tenants by engaging in the 
initial mediation of their complaints and by referring tenants to 
other sources of help. Many consumer protection bureaus have 
processes whereby initial consumer complaints are fielded by non-
attorney advocates. These advocates may attempt to mediate com-
plaints as a matter of course, such that, when a tenant files a com-
plaint, the advocate sends a mediation letter to the landlord being 
complained about.364 This process alone can help the individual 
tenant without the office escalating the matter further. Consumer 
fraud bureaus may additionally refer complaining tenants to pro 
bono legal assistance or code enforcement.365 The value of these
efforts should not be downplayed. Still, reforms are necessary for 
consumer agencies to more robustly utilize their enforcement 
power to protect tenants.
B. Reforms in States Whose UDAP Laws Do Not Protect Tenants
In a sizeable minority of states,366 it is difficult for consumer 
fraud bureaus to protect tenants because the UDAP statute they 
enforce does not protect tenants. The most obvious reform, then, 
is for the legislature to amend the statute to cover tenant-landlord 
matters. Such reforms can take a number of forms. Most intuitive-
ly, the legislature can amend the definition of “commerce” to ex-
plicitly include tenant-landlord matters. Further, the legislature 
can incorporate the state tenant-landlord law to the list of enumer-
ated statutes whose violation is considered a per se UDAP violation 




364. See, e.g., Michigan Interview, supra note 247 (“We mediate them [complaints from 
tenants] . . . like any other complaint that we get.”).
365. See, e.g., South Carolina Interview, supra note 241; Iowa Interview, supra note 242;
Idaho Interview, supra note 236; Connecticut Interview, supra note 244; Vermont Interview,
supra note 232.
366. See NCLC, supra note 27, § 8.2; see generally Thomas, supra note 145, at §§ 3, 6.
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oriented statute also constitutes a presumptive UDAP violation. 
More subtly still, the legislature can add a provision to the tenant-
landlord code giving the attorney general enforcement authority 
over some or all of its provisions. There are, however, significant 
hurdles to enacting legislative fixes, especially in states with power-
ful landlord and property management lobbies. It is thus worth 
exploring other courses of action that will allow these agencies to 
more robustly protect tenants.
One regulatory solution, which bypasses the legislative process, 
is for consumer agencies to enact regulations interpreting their 
UDAP statute to apply to tenants. The agency cannot enact regula-
tions which contradict the plain language of the statute. In many 
instances, however, courts holding that UDAP does not apply to 
tenants are interpreting an ambiguous statute.367 For example, as 
discussed above, several courts read tenant-landlord law to displace 
UDAP’s application to tenants even where the statute itself con-
tains no anti-bootstrapping provision.368 In such instances, courts 
may defer to regulations espousing a contrary interpretation.369
Another solution, which requires the passage of neither state-
specific litigation nor the adoption of regulation, is participation in 
multistate litigation. State consumer agencies have shown a will-
ingness to team up with other states to regulate industries not cov-
ered by their own UDAP statutes. Indeed, states participated in na-
tional mortgage servicing litigation even where their state UDAP 
statute did not apply to mortgage banks.370 Because defendants in 
multistate litigation must often settle with all plaintiffs at once, 
states may be able to obtain consent judgments even where their 
underlying UDAP statute does not cover the regulated industry.371
This solution is increasingly appealing as the rental industry has 
become increasingly nationalized in recent years.372
Similarly, state consumer fraud bureaus may collaborate with 
federal actors beyond joint litigation efforts. For example, state 
consumer fraud bureaus may be able to bring larger scale abuses to 
367. See supra Section II.A.2; e.g., Heritage Hills v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ohio 
1990) (holding UDAP is displaced by tenant-landlord laws even though statute contained no 
regulated industry exemption).
368. See supra Section II.A.2.
369. Aaron Saiger, Chevron and State Deference in Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
555, 557–60 (2014) (noting that, while most states do not embrace Chevron deference as en-
thusiastically as federal courts, most state courts do defer at least somewhat to state regula-
tions in certain instances).
370. For example, Michigan entered into a consent judgment with the defendants in the 
national mortgage settlement regarding their mortgage servicing practices even though 
Michigan’s UDAP is read not to apply to the mortgage-servicing industry. NCLC, supra note 
27, at App. B.
371. Id.
372. See Lee, supra note 348; see Semuels, supra note 298.
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the attention of the FTC and DOJ and aid in investigations.373 As 
discussed earlier, while the FTC and CFPB do not prioritize tenant 
issues, state consumer enforcement action can influence federal 
priorities.374 As such, even in states where UDAP statutes do not 
cover tenants, consumer fraud agencies may take enforcement ac-
tion to protect renters.
C.  Reforms in States Whose UDAP Law Covers Tenants
As discussed, consumer protection agencies tend not to fully in-
corporate tenant protection into their mandates even if the under-
lying UDAP statute and corresponding jurisprudence allow them 
to do so. This Section proposes reforms that will better allow such 
agencies to protect tenant-consumers. This Section will largely fo-
cus on the institutional barriers, especially those cited by bureaus 
themselves, and propose ways to overcome them. Section IV.C.1 
will propose changes in institutional norms and viewpoints (intan-
gible reforms). Section IV.C.2 will discuss reforms to bureaus’
complaint processes, and Section IV.C.3 will address concerns 
about agency resources.
1.  Intangible Reforms
At a somewhat fundamental level, if agencies are to better pro-
tect tenants, they must start viewing tenants as similarly situated 
with other consumers. For example, the notion that agencies have 
insufficient resources to protect tenants begs the question, why 
agency resources should be allocated to other consumer groups in-
stead. While it is quite possible that agencies focusing more on 
tenants must focus less on, for instance, home repair cases, this on-
ly becomes a reason not to prioritize tenants if home repair con-
sumers are already considered more central to the agency’s mis-
sion.
Similarly, before assuming tenants have access to other re-
sources, it is necessary to assess the practical value of those alterna-
tive resources. Agencies must ensure not to create a Hobson’s
373. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Sweep Against 10 Auto 
Dealers (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-
announces-sweep-against-10-auto-dealers [https://perma.cc/4X2X-QD25]. Tellingly, Michi-
gan’s UDAP law likely does not cover truth-in-lending matters regarding auto loans. Still, in 
2014, Michigan’s Attorney General helped the FTC investigate lending fraud by an auto 
lender as part of the FTC’s industry sweep.
374. Pridgen, supra note 33, at 930.
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choice for tenants, where consumer agencies do not focus on ten-
ant issues because tenants have access to false or inadequate alter-
natives. For example, while code enforcement and Legal Aid strive 
to protect tenants, code enforcement is severely hamstrung by un-
derfunding and limitations in scope,375 and Legal Aid only has the 
capacity to help so many clients.376
Relatedly, agencies must ensure parity between tenants and oth-
er consumer groups who have other resources available to them. 
For example, agencies commonly litigate home repair cases377 even 
though repair contractors are often regulated by state licensing 
boards, local permit administrators, and distinct statutory 
schemes.378
Similarly, bureaus may be hesitant to litigate tenant cases be-
cause tenant complaints are individuated and fact intensive. But 
this does not distinguish tenant cases from home repair or used car 
cases, which bureaus often do litigate.379 Indeed, home repair cases 
necessarily involve analyzing the quality of multiple home repair 
jobs and used car cases involve investigating the specific problems 
with specific cars. In fact, it is all the more important for enforce-
ment agencies to aggregate individuated complaints as their fact 
intensive nature may make them ineligible for class relief.380
Consumer protection agencies also appear more willing to tar-
get classically “deceptive” business practices than practices that fall 
more into “unfairness,” to the potential detriment of tenants.381 As 
noted above, abuses faced by tenants are more likely to be coer-
375. See Sabbeth, supra note 208, at 130.
376. The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/what-legal-
aid/unmet-need-legal-aid [https://perma.cc/56PJ-QXZ8].
377. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 66 tbl. 4.
378. HOME ADVISOR, supra note 199.
379. See, e.g., Your Rights under Maryland’s Lemon Law, MD. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.
marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages/CPD/lemon.aspx [https://perma.cc/LML2-GCB5]
(providing examples of Lemon Law violations which exemplify the likely fact-intensive na-
ture of such enforcement actions).
380. See Waterstone, supra note 29, at 463.
381. See MORRISON & FOSTER, THE CFPB & UDAAP: A “KNOW IT WHEN YOU SEE IT?”
STANDARD 7–28 (2014),  https://media2.mofo.com/documents/140604-cfpb-udaap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9DF-2MPC] (showing that the CFPB employs deception authority near-
ly three times as often as unfairness authority); James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discre-
tion: The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 87, 109–
10 (2015) (discussing FTC hesitance to expand the scope of its standalone “unfairness” au-
thority); Peterson, supra note 29, at 1092 (noting that CFPB unfairness claims are generally 
coupled with deception claims because most ‘deceptive’ behavior also likely constitutes ‘un-
fair’ behavior and also the CFPB’s cautious use of “abusiveness” standard); Cox et al., supra
note 29, at 53 (noting that between 2011 and 2015, the CFPB only employed the “abusive-
ness” standard, which is in ways analogous to state unfairness); Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC 
and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 350–60 (2008); see supra Section II.C.1 (illustrat-
ing how representatives from several enforcement bureaus note that their bureau is more 
likely to target more classic instances of “deception”).
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cive, injurious, or violating of public policy than classically decep-
tive. For example, an illegal lockout, while arguably implicitly 
communicating a deceptive message to tenants, is more clearly 
problematic because it fits within the UDAP unfairness factors.382
While “unfair” may be a more inherently ambiguous standard than 
“deceptive,” a shift towards greater enforcement of unfair practices
will be beneficial to tenant consumers.
2.  Lack of Actionable Tenant Complaints
A more concrete barrier to consumer agencies prioritizing ten-
ant issues is the lack of actionable complaints for tenants. Agen-
cies, understandably, rely largely on consumer complaints to find 
targets of enforcement actions. Even though agencies do receive a 
quantitatively high number of tenant complaints, they tend to lack 
a critical mass of complaints against a single target regarding a dis-
tinct issue. There are ways for agencies to police industries, howev-
er, while relying less on seemingly anecdotal individual complaints 
trickling in one at a time.
Agencies can learn about industry abuses from an array of 
sources beyond consumer complaints. Such sources may have al-
ready aggregated consumer complaints in ways useful to consumer 
protection agencies. One such source is media reports, which may 
help identify bad landlords, their bad practices, and the names of 
tenants complaining about them. Searches of legal databases to 
find the businesses most commonly facing litigation from tenants 
may also prove useful. Collaborations with code enforcement, Le-
gal Aid, and other entities who track tenant grievances may further 
inform consumer agencies of potential targets.
Agencies should also use their pre-litigation subpoena power to 
police the rental industry. Consumer protection agencies generally 
have the power to issue pre-litigation investigatory subpoenas 
against potential targets. In all probability, tenants are often more 
likely to complain directly to landlords than to consumer enforce-
ment agencies, and agencies may be able to subpoena such inter-
nal complaints.383 Bureaus can employ creative strategies to find 
targets. In instances where an agency learns, perhaps from the me-
382. See Illinois v. Safeguard Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 5, 2014) (deny-
ing Safeguard’s motion to dismiss Illinois’s UDAP claim based on Safeguard illegally eject-
ing legal occupants of foreclosed homes and stating that the deceptiveness element that the 
business must intend for the consumer to rely on the illegal activity makes little sense in 
evaluating unfairness).
383. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 78, Illinois v. Safeguard Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013); see also, NCLC, supra note 27, § 13.
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dia, that abuses within a certain industry are rampant, the agency 
can subpoena the subjects of these media reports or, if lacking 
such reports, the largest players in an industry notorious for abuse.
For example, one of the higher profile state consumer agency 
actions protecting tenants was Illinois’s 2013 lawsuit against Safe-
guard Properties for illegally evicting tenants and homeowners 
from foreclosed properties.384 The lawsuit resulted in a million-
dollar settlement, which largely went towards restitution for con-
sumers, and the first major reforms in the default property man-
agement industry.385 Tellingly, Illinois’s Complaint alleged both 
that Safeguard was the largest player in the industry and that the 
Attorney General had knowledge of many consumer complaints 
made directly to Safeguard by Illinois residents.386
Consumer fraud bureaus may also take action to solicit more 
targeted and actionable consumer complaints. Media and publicity 
campaigns and initial high-profile actions by the consumer fraud 
bureaus themselves can effectively solicit consumers to complain 
about specific issues or against specific entities. New York has em-
ployed both targeted solicitation of tenant complaints and collabo-
ration with other tenant service providers to more aggressively en-
force tenants’ rights as consumer rights.387 For example, New 
York’s AG, by far the nation’s most active in enforcing tenants’
rights, employs a special tenant complaint form388 and collaborates 
with other agencies and non-profits specifically formed to assist 
tenants.389 The state’s expressed intent to help tenants as consum-
ers then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy by generating addition-
al tenant complaints.
384. See generally Complaint, Illinois v. Safeguard Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 9, 2013).
385. Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Madigan Announces $1 Million Settlement with Safe-
guard Properties (June 3, 2015), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015
_06/20150603.html [https://perma.cc/H6EZ-XYCH].
386. See Ill. Att’y Gen., supra note 385; Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 78, Illinois v. Safeguard 
Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013).
387. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James And Governor 
Cuomo Announce Lawsuit Against Queens Landlord for Violating Rent Stabilization Laws 
and Tenant Harassment (Mar. 1, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney-
general-james-and-governor-cuomo-announce-lawsuit-against-queens [https://perma.cc
/VH4U-UHS3] (discussing AG consumer fraud lawsuit, in collaboration with NY’s Tenant 
Protection Unit, Legal Services NYC, and other organizations protecting tenants, against 
major landlord for tenant harassment and violation of rent control laws); see also Tenant 
Harassment, NYC.GOV: BLDGS., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/renter/tenant-
harrassment.page [https://perma.cc/KK87-8PG6] (describing coordination between state 
and local agencies by Tenant Harassment Task Force).
388. See N.Y. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF L., RENT SECURITY COMPLAINT FORM (2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/nyc-rent-security-complaint-english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N388-KFE6].
389. See N.Y. Att’y Gen., supra note 387.
SPRING 2021] Protecting Tenants 731
3.  Concerns about Resources
Consumer enforcement bureaus may be concerned that if they 
venture strongly into the tenant arena, they will be overwhelmed 
with tenant complaints. After all, consumer bureaus do not have 
the resources to handle thousands of individual tenant complaints, 
nor are they equipped to double as code enforcement. This obsta-
cle, however, is not unique to regulation of the rental industry. 
Consumer protection agencies adapt to this problem in their polic-
ing of other markets and can apply similar strategies here.
First, especially in more concentrated rental markets, agencies 
can target larger rental property investors or property manage-
ment companies. Such actions are likely to be high profile and 
thus have at least some general deterrent effect across the industry. 
In pursuing mortgage servicing litigation, for example, consumer 
enforcement agencies tellingly targeted the biggest banks.390
Further, forcing a market-dominant business to reform may 
force industry-wide reform. For example, if a major property man-
agement company agrees not to solicit renters with leases contain-
ing illegal provisions, landlords utilizing that company must ensure 
their leases do not contain those illegal provisions, or else must 
find another management company, which may be difficult and 
expensive.
In less concentrated markets, consumer fraud bureaus still find 
ways to send shots across the bow. For example, agencies may en-
gage in industry sweeps, where a number of lawsuits are filed sim-
ultaneously against different businesses within an industry to chal-
lenge a common industry practice.391 If, for example, a consumer 
fraud bureau announces a number of lawsuits against small land-
lords for failing to make repairs, this sends a message to other 
390. See generally Settlement Documents, supra note 122 (listing settlement documents from 
national mortgage litigation brought by states and federal agencies targeting major mort-
gage servicers such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase).
391. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department and Federal Partners An-
nounce Enforcement Actions of Dietary Supplement Cases (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-partners-announce-
enforcement-actions-dietary-supplement-cases [https://perma.cc/RT3C-CA6W] (dietary 
supplements); Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Southern Illinois Takes Part in Largest-Ever Na-
tionwide Elder Fraud Sweep (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdil/pr/southern-
illinois-takes-part-largest-ever-nationwide-elder-fraud-sweep [https://perma.cc/5TZE-4NFW]
(elder fraud); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Law Enforcement Partners Announce 
New Crackdown on Illegal Robocalls (June 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2019/06/ftc-law-enforcement-partners-announce-new-crackdown-illegal
[https://perma.cc/BQF5-UVUY] (telemarketing calls); Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Madi-
gan Cracks Down on Unlicensed Public Insurance Adjusters, Home Repair Scams Across 
Chicagoland Area (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2012
_04/20120423.html [https://perma.cc/QLU7-DD69] (unlicensed insurance adjusting).
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small landlords. Consumer protection agencies adapt to their lack 
of resources by targeting large players or taking concentrated ac-
tion against a number of smaller players. Agencies can readily ap-
ply such strategies to the rental market.
CONCLUSION
Thus, while residential tenants are similarly situated to other 
consumers, they lack legal parity with traditional consumers. Con-
sumer protection agencies’ treatment of tenant issues helps illus-
trate this disparity. This Article attempts to elaborate upon and 
propose solutions to such enforcement trends. Still, there has been 
little quantitative analysis regarding the types of enforcement ac-
tions brought by consumer enforcement issues. One of the few 
studies that undertakes this analysis did not code for tenant-
landlord actions.392 Thus, more complete quantitative corrobora-
tion of this Article’s claims will be necessary, as will a quantitative 
analysis of the types of actions consumer enforcement agencies do 
take to protect or educate tenants.
There is little literature of whether tenants should be treated as 
consumers within a consumer protection regime dominated by 
UDAP enforcement. This Article, hopefully, fills some of those 
gaps and helps to bring attention to the consumer abuses faced by 
tenants.
But more analysis is necessary, especially in light of COVID-19. 
Consumer scams generally, and rental scams specifically, have pro-
liferated during the pandemic. 393 Further, like the Foreclosure Cri-
sis of the late aughts, the economic fallout from the pandemic 
leaves tenants especially vulnerable. Facing job and income loss, 
those seeking to rent have fewer options. A new wave of foreclo-
sures394 caused by the pandemic will likely lead to a new wave of 
landlord absenteeism and illegal evictions by foreclosing lenders. 
This Article was written primarily before the pandemic, but how 
consumer agencies protect tenants in the midst of the pandemic 
requires further inquiry.
392. E-mail from Cox, supra note 135.
393. See, e.g., Emma Fletcher, Pandemic Purchases Lead to Record Reports of Unreceived Goods,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 1, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/data-
spotlight/2020/07/pandemic-purchases-lead-record-reports-unreceived-goods [https://
perma.cc/HH9S-GUZF]; Randy Mac, Rental Scammers Take Advantage of Coronavirus Pandemic,
NBC L.A. (May 6, 2020), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/rental-scammers-take-
advantage-of-coronavirus-pandemic/2358403 [https://perma.cc/6W3W-4DT7].
394. See Jeff Andrews, A Foreclosure Crisis Could Still Happen, CURBED (July 27, 2020),
https://www.curbed.com/2020/7/27/21335855/coronavirus-foreclosures-housing-crisis.
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APPENDIX A
An appendix that includes a survey of all enforcement actions 
brought on behalf of tenants by agencies of the fifty states, District 
of Columbia, and U.S. territories prior to August 7, 2019 can be 
found online at mjlr.org.
APPENDIX B
An appendix that lists all federal tenant protection suits prior to 
August 7, 2019 can be found online at mjlr.org.

